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Resumo 
A diminuição da pobreza é um dos objetivos mais importantes das políticas de 
desenvolvimento dos países em vias de desenvolvimento (PVD) que, todavia, está ainda 
longe de ser alcançado. As medidas de diminuição da pobreza, quer ao nível local quer 
ao nível nacional, não têm sido satisfatórias, o que remete para as ações ao nível global 
(WorldBank, 2001, p. vi). Nos seus esforços no sentido de aumentar a eficácia da ajuda 
ao desenvolvimento, os doadores de ajuda e os países recipientes estão comprometidos 
a conferir maior eficácia às ajudas para irem de encontro à Declaração de Paris (OECD, 
2005, p. 1). A Declaração de Paris estabeleceu cinco princípios que os países doadores e 
os países recipientes de ajuda ao desenvolvimento devem respeitar para garantirem a 
eficácia da ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Também ficou estabelecido que a 
responsabilidade do processo de desenvolvimento pertence aos países que recebem 
ajuda ao desenvolvimento, o que remete para o papel de liderança e autonomia dos 
respetivas políticas e estratégias de desenvolvimento (OECD, 2005, p. 2). O objetivo 
desta dissertação é analisar os esforços empreendidos pelo governo da Suazilândia no 
sentido tomar a liderança das políticas e estratégias de redução da pobreza, em 
conformidade com a Declaração de Paris e com a Agenda de Accra. A Suazilândia é um 
caso cheio de complexidades pelo facto de ser classificada como país de baixo-médio 
rendimento e, não obstante, 69% da população viver em miséria, por ser um dos países 
com menor taxa de crescimento económico da região subsaariana, e por ter uma das 
maiores taxas de incidência da SIDA/HIV. Perante estes desafios socioeconómicos, as 
autoridades da Suazilândia devem ser cuidadosas na escolha das prioridades relevantes 
para o desenvolvimento e para a diminuição da pobreza. 
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Abstract  
Poverty reduction is one the most important development agenda’s for much of the 
developing world, and it is a challenge that is yet to be met. Poverty reduction actions at 
the local and thenational levels have not been enough, which is why global action 
through development aid plays such an important role countries take action to end 
poverty (World Bank, 2001, p. vi). In its efforts the increase the impact aid has in 
poverty reduction, donor and partner countries are committed to “(...) scale up for more 
effective aid”, as stated in the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005, p. 1).  
The Paris Declaration agreed on five key principles that donors and partner countries 
need to adhere to in order to ensure the effectiveness of aid. Most importantly, it was 
also agreed that development is the responsibility of developing countries by taking 
greater leadership over their development policies and strategies (OECD, 2005, p. 2). 
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess the efforts made by the Government of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland in taking greater leadership over its poverty reduction policies 
and strategies as stated in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda. The case of 
Swaziland is filled with complexities as it is classified as a lower-middle income 
country and yet 69 per cent of the population lives in poverty, it is one of the slowest 
growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa and has the world’s highest HIV/AIDS 
prevalence. Faced with these socio-economic challenges, it is important that the 
Government of Swaziland makes the right priorities that will effectively address the 
development challenges in the country and will assist in poverty reduction.    
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I. Introduction 
1.1. Problem Statement and Rationale  
The series of commitments made at the United Nations Millennium Summit in 
September 2001 marked the endorsement of the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration. This endorsement reflected a new commitment towards a global 
partnership to reduce extreme poverty. It set out a series of targets known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs
1
) (UNAIDS, 2013). The MDGs are a reflection 
of the contemporary aid architecture, and the dramatic paradigm shift in development 
thinking. There has been an evolution to the approach of poverty reduction over the past 
fifty years. Such an evolution can be traced back to the investments in physical capital 
and infrastructure during the 1950s and 1960s, the focus on health and education in the 
1980’s, the role of governance and institutions in the 1990’s, (World Bank, 2001, p. 6), 
to the current approach which places the achievement of MDGs at the centre of the 
stage. Having said that, development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remains 
somewhat of a mystery to the international policy community. Like the international 
evolution of the approach toward development assistance, Africa’s has witnessed its fair 
share of strategies and approaches which have ranged from the modernisation theory in 
the 1960s to providing support to services aimed at meeting basic human needs, and to 
the neo-liberal market theories and good governance, and yet poverty persists (Hyden, 
2007, p. 16751). The current international development aid architecture aims at 
addressing issues of poverty reduction by improving the effectiveness of aid (Cassimon 
& van Campenhout, 2007, p. 742). 
One of the primary objectives of foreign aid in developing countries is to assist in 
economic growth, and equally important is the objective of poverty reduction. 
According to Burnside and Dollar (1998, p. 2), “(i)n general, poverty reduction and 
growth go hand-in-hand, but it is still possible that foreign aid has been successful in 
mitigating poverty but not had much measurable effects on growth”. Burnside and 
Dollar (1998) recognised that poverty reduction cannot only be limited to economic 
growth but can also be achieved through other channels. The effectiveness of these 
channels has been subject to major debate over the years and has gained its current 
                                                          
1
Appendix 1 illustrates the official list of MDG indicators. 
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prominence from the disappointment with development outcomes in developing states, 
despite the vast amounts of funding towards development programmes (Stolk, 2006, p. 
1).   
There is significant literature that associates the effectiveness of aid with economic 
growth, poverty reduction, good governance and good policies in the recipient state. As 
Burnside & Dollar (2000, p. 848) point out, “(...) the estimated impact of aid for a 
country with average policies is zero.” Countries with good policies and significant 
amounts of aid, on the other hand, perform very well. Accordingly, the First High Level 
Forum aimed at improving the delivery of aid is the Rome Declaration 2003.The Rome 
Declaration outlines a set of principles for aid effectiveness. The Second High Level 
Forum is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in which donors and partner 
countries mutually agreed to the commitments laid out in the Paris Declaration and 
agreed to hold each other mutually accountable for ensuring its success. The Paris 
Declaration (OECD, 2005, pp. 3-8) outlines five fundamental Partnership 
Commitments/Indicators of Progress for making aid more effective: 
i. Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies, and strategies and coordinate development actions; 
ii. Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures; 
iii. Harmonisation: Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and 
collectively effective;  
iv. Managing for Results: Managing resources and improving decision-making 
results; and 
v. Mutual Accountability: Donors and Partners are accountable for development 
results. 
The efforts to accelerate and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness were made known in the Accra Agenda for Action 2008. The Accra 
Agenda for Action proposed three key areas of improvement: strengthening country 
ownership over development;building more effective and inclusive partnerships for 
development;and delivering and accounting for development results (OECD, 2008, pp. 
16-19). 
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Partner country ownership and leadership over development policies and strategies are 
paramount. During the Paris Declaration one of the commitments made by the 
stakeholders was to address the remaining challenges faced due to “(...) weaknesses in 
partner countries’ institutional capacities to develop and implement results-driven 
national development strategies.” (OECD, 2005a, p. 1) As one of the five pillars of the 
Paris Declaration, “ownership” primarily refers to developing country’s governments’ 
abilities to exercise leadership over development policies and plans (OECD, 2011a, p. 
29).  According to the World Bank (2001, p. 12) ownership can be manifest by 
(...) countries need to develop their own poverty reduction strategies in a manner consistent with 
preservation of culture. Decisions on priorities must be made at a national level, reflecting national 
priorities. But action must also take place with local leadership and ownership, reflecting local realities. 
There is no simple universal blueprint. 
Ownership is articulated through the development priorities set out in national 
development strategies, which, according to the OECD (2011a, p. 29) involve “(...) 
partner countries taking lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other 
development resources.” According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 
2000/01: Attacking Poverty (2001, p. 12) development aid should be 
(...)delivered in ways that ensure greater ownership by recipient countries, and should go increasingly to 
country-driven, results-oriented poverty reduction programs, developed with the effective engagement of 
civil society and private sector agents. 
The rationale for this dissertation stems from the recognition of the need to make 
development aid more effective, in particular the role of partner countries’ in ensuring 
the effectiveness of aid in achieving poverty reduction through prioritised strategies in 
the form of national development strategies and poverty reductions strategy papers 
(PRSPs).  
1.2. Research Question  
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess the Government of Swaziland’s (GoS) 
ownership of poverty reduction plans and priorities. In doing so, my research questions 
are the following: 
1. Does the GoS have an operational national development strategy? 
2. What are the poverty reduction priorities of the GoS? 
3. Does the GoS refer to national development strategy when formulating 
development policies and plans? 
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4. How inclusive is the formulation process for development strategies and 
policies? 
5. How effectively does the GoS co-ordinated development aid? 
6. Do development partners/donors provide development aid in accordance with 
the GoS development priorities? 
The assessment will be based on partner countries’ commitments for ownership as 
stated in the Paris declaration (OECD, 2005a, p. 3): 
Partner countries commit to:   
1. Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies 
through broad consultative processes; 
2. Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational 
programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets; 
3. Take lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development resources in 
dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector.   
1.3. Scope, Methodology and Research Limitations   
As previously stipulated, this dissertation aims to assess the commitment made by the 
GoS in taking greater ownership over development priorities and strategies. Swaziland’s 
development agenda is guided by the National Development Strategy (NDS). The NDS 
has been the overarching national planning framework since its adoption in 1999, and 
contains the overall vision for development (GoS, 1999a, p. 1). The NDS is purely a 
vision and cannot be implemented as it stands. Therefore, the vision is implemented 
through the Poverty Reduction Action Strategy Plan (PRASP).  The PRASP articulates 
the necessary measures that will help ensure the achievement of the overall poverty 
reduction and development agenda set out in the NDS.  
According to the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005a, p. 3), donors need to commit to, 
“(b)ase their overall support-country strategies, policy dialogues and development co-
operation programmes on partners’ national development strategies.” Accordingly, 
development partners in Swaziland are informed of the national priorities which have 
been set out in the overall vision of the NDS. Donors are encouraged to align their 
support in accordance with the challenges articulated in the NDS, and implement 
initiatives in accordance with the PRASP. Aligning Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to national development objectives promotes greater ownership of development 
interventions by the recipient countries, thus increasing the likelihood of interventions 
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having a meaningful and sustainable impact (GoS, 2013, p. 14). It should be noted that 
the donors presence in Swaziland is relatively small in comparison to regional 
counterparts, since Swaziland has a combined total of eight bilateral and multilateral 
development partners. 
I have carried my research from mid-January 2013 to mid-July 2013. The primary 
method of data collection was predominantly qualitative by nature. This included in-
depth individual interviews with representatives of a number of institutions and 
organisations (listed in appendix 2). The interviews were guided by open ended 
questions which were based on a standardised questionnaire
2
. Although the interviews 
were, for the most part, very helpful and informative, I did experience some limitations. 
Recognising that institutions and organisations are made up of a host of departments 
which are responsible for several aspects of the overall objectives of the institutions or 
organisations, I came to realise that employees are not always aware of all the ins and 
outs of the institutions or organisations as a whole. Some respondents were aware of 
Swaziland’s national development priorities, while others were not. Furthermore, during 
some interviews, personal opinions were shared rather than concrete evidence. This is 
not to say that this was the case with all the interviews. During my time as an intern at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland – starting September 2012 to December 2012 – I was fortunate enough to 
observe the 15
th.
 Political Dialogue between Swaziland and its development partners. 
The dialogue gave me much needed insight on the development priorities of the GoS 
and the commitments made by the development partners and the GoS towards realising 
Swaziland’s development objectives. 
 Finally, much of my research was conducted through an extensive literature review 
which included books, annual budgetary reports, GoS documents, development 
partners’ documents, newspaper articles, journals, and internet sources. Document 
analysis has been the major form of gathering information throughout this dissertation. I 
found that accessing information from the GoS very difficult because public libraries do 
not have many government publications, the GoS website is not updated and has a 
limited amount of government publications and documents uploaded, and the relevant 
                                                          
2
 Refer to appendix 2 for the list of interviews and appendix 3 for the questionnaire guide. There are two 
questionnaires, the donor questionnaire and the GoS questionnaire.   
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ministries often do not have additional hardcopies to spare. This made it particularly 
difficult to have a cohesive flow of information. I found that the interviewees from the 
Government departments were very eager to assist, and in particular, the official from 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and Developments (MEPD), Aid Coordination 
department was very helpful in uploading documents that were necessary for my 
dissertation. Another challenge I faced was accessing relevant, timely, and updated 
information, in particular from government publications and documents. I had to rely on 
external sources such and the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for statistical 
information including indicators, financial figures, and sometimes the GoS budgetary 
operations. 
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II. The Evolution of Development Cooperation  
Introduction 
This chapter sets out to briefly describe development cooperation and briefly touch on 
the several forms it has taken throughout the years. Section 2.1 provides the definition 
of development aid, while section 2.2 makes a distinction between bilateral and 
multilateral aid. Section 2.3 encompasses a brief historical overview of development 
cooperation. This section includes three sub-sections that follow the evolution of 
development assistance from 1940 to 1990. Finally, the international contemporary aid 
architecture, outlined in section 2.4, describes the current framework of development 
aid and the several initiatives taken to improve the effectiveness of aid.   
2.1. Defining Development Cooperation 
Development aid, also known as development cooperation, official development aid, 
development assistance (these terms will be used interchangeably throughout this 
dissertation) has had multiple face lifts over the decades and continues to undergo 
important changes. Amstutz (2013, p. 227) suggests that, “(f)oreign aid involves two 
types of assistance: humanitarian or emergency relief and development 
aid.”Humanitarian or emergency relief provides assistance to meet humanitarian needs 
such as droughts, earthquakes, and other disasters that call for immediate relief. This 
could be best illustrated in the aftermath of the devastation caused by Asian tsunami in 
December 2005, and/or the massive earthquake and floods that devastated Haiti 
between January and April of 2010. In both instances foreign states, led by the United 
States, responded immediately with large quantities of food and water, financial aid, 
medical care, and other forms of assistance. Development aid, or ODA, consists of 
loans and grants from bilateral donors, multilateral donors, and private donors to aid in 
the economic development of developing and less-developed countries (LDCs) 
(Amstutz, 2013, p. 277). 
There are several forms of aid that serve a variety of purposes. Financial aid, according 
to Sumner and Mallett (2013), can be either concessional or non-concessional: non-
concessional aid refers to grants or subsidised loans, whereas non-concessional aid 
refers to loans that carry market, or near market terms. ODA is the most well known 
form of financial aid, which can be disaggregated further into project aid and program 
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aid (Sumner and Mallett, 2013, p. 15). Non-financial aid includes food aid and technical 
assistance. The latter consists of projects, program and technical aid with the primary 
purpose of knowledge transfer (Sumner and Mallett, 2013, p. 16). Food aid, on the other 
hand, can be either sold on the market or can be freely distributed. Food aid can also be 
tied to loans, grants, or associated financing packages. In such cases food aid is often 
tied to the procurement of goods and/or services from the donor country, and/or is 
restricted by a number of countries. An example of such a tie is the use of donors’ boats 
for the shipment of commodities. An estimated 90 per cent of world food aid is tied 
(Burchi and Turchetti, 2010, p. 148). 
According to Minoiu and Reddy (2009, p. 7), “(d)evelopment aid may be defined as aid 
intended to promote development in the receiving state.” The Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC)(OEDC, 2008) defines ODA as follows: 
i. It is provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive 
agencies; and  
ii. each transaction of which: 
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective; and  
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10per cent). 
2.2. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid  
There are several actors in international development cooperation and it is important to 
make a clear distinction between bilateral and multilateral donors. Bilateral aid is given 
by the government of the donor country to the government of the receiving country, 
while multilateral aid is channelled by governments through international organisations 
such as the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and the IMF (World Vision, 2007).  
Many bilateral aid donors are members of the OECD. It is through the DAC of OECD 
that the responsibility of setting aid reporting standards, monitoring aid flows, and 
urging donors to improve the quality and the quantity of aid are monitored. The DAC’s 
primary focus is on ODA, which is defined as official concessional flows for 
developmental purposes to low-income countries. In contrast to multilateral aid, most 
bilateral aid is given as grants and may be used to fund a specific project (project aid), 
to provide more general budgetary support for the recipient government (program aid), 
or to flow through a Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) (Kilby, 2009, p. 35). Fig. 
2.1 and Fig. 2.2, below, will serve as a reference not only to the financial amount of 
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development aid dispersed from the 1960-2010 period, but will often be referred to as a 
visual aid for the historical overview of development aid. Fig. 2.1 will also be used to 
refer to bilateral aid while Fig.2.2 will be used to refer to multilateral aid. 
 
Source: OECD (2012, available at <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/> [Accessed 
13/03/2013]. 
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Source: OECD (2012, available at <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/> [Accessed 
13/03/2013]. 
2.3. A Historical Overview of Development Aid 
This section briefly examines the historical overview of the ever-changing nature of 
development aid, and the complexities faced throughout the years to ensure the success 
of development aid. Lancaster (2007, pp. 146-148) highlights three main antecedents of 
aid: 
i. The use of public resources for humanitarian relief, which in modern times 
began in the 19
th.
 century; 
ii. The small amount of assistance provided by European powers for development 
in their colonies during the interwar years; and 
iii. The limited quantity of technical assistance provided by the United States to 
Latin American countries at the beginning of the Second World War. 
It has also been argued that despite the ever-changing history of aid there has been one 
constant: development objectives of aid have been more than often self-serving towards 
donors’ commercial and political advantage (Hjertholm and White, 2000, p. 80).  
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Accompanying the motives of self-interest is the ongoing debate about the role and 
effectiveness of foreign aid (Robinson and Tarp, 2000, p. 3). 
2.3.1. A Successful Story (1940s, 1950s, 1960s) 
The post-World War II liberal international system was marked by numerous efforts to 
bring about closer economic integration through increased international cooperation and 
assistance (as well as through the promotion of trade liberalization). This new vision 
gave rise to the Bretton Woods conference, the formation of multilateral institutions 
such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), and the Marshall Plan (Goldin, 2009, p. 42). With the aim to rebuild the 
international economic system after the Second World War delegates from forty-four 
states gathered for deliberation in July 1944 at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire, United States (U.S). These institutions – UN, IMF, GATT, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – also known as the 
Bretton Woods institutions, were established to sustain the post-World War II liberal 
international economic order
3
 (Shimko, 2013, p. 136). 
Formally known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, the Bretton 
Woods Conference produced three major accomplishments to help sustain the liberal 
international economic order: the IMF was created to finance short-term imbalances in 
international payments in order to stabilise exchange rates; the IBRD – known today as 
the World Bank – was created to make long-term capital available to states urgently in 
need of foreign aid (both institutions were established in 1944) (Linebarger, 2008, p. 
16). The final element of the post-war liberal order was the establishment of the GATT 
in 1947, with the aim of promoting free trade between the contracting nations (Shimko, 
2013, p. 136). 
The GATT became the most important instrument for international trade, as its primary 
goal was to liberalise trade, reduce trade barriers and create an environment in which 
countries can prosper
4
 (Boyes and Melvin, 2008, p. 624). Free trade is of particular 
                                                          
3
The liberal international economic order is the post-World War II international economic order that 
embodies traditional liberal preferences for free trade as a means of promoting economic efficiency and 
prosperity (Skimko, 2013, p. 136). 
4
In 1995 the GATT became the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the pursuit of healthy trade 
relations, members of the WTO have agreed to settle trade disputes in the WTO courts rather than raise 
barriers, impose tariffs, or otherwise restrict trade (Boyes and Melvin, 2008, p. 624). 
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importance, and has been defended by theorists such as David Ricardo and Adam Smith 
based on two economic concepts: the division of labour, and theory of comparative 
advantage (Shimko, 2013, pp. 138-139). The benefits of opening markets to free trade 
can be considerable to developing countries. According to Boyes and Melvin (2008, p. 
442) the restrictions on trade in developed countries can harm developing countries as 
they are often aimed at the commodities that developing countries can produce most 
efficiently, i.e. “(t)he European Union restricts imports of agricultural products in order 
to increase the incomes of European farmers”. By lifting these obstacles, income in 
developing countries could increase substantially. 
A brainchild of the then U.S Secretary of State George Marshall, the European 
Recovery Program, or the Marshall Plan, was launched in 1947. It successfully, and 
exclusively, provided foreign aid towards the reconstruction and recovery of a war-torn 
Europe. Such a reconstruction was financed to those economies with valuable human 
capital (Rothermund, 2006, pp. 266-267). This plan included a short-term goal of 
recovery, a medium-term goal of modernization, and a long-term goal of liberalization. 
Perhaps it is the best example of successful multinational cooperation to achieve a 
common goal (Agnew and Entrikin, 2004, p. 20). 
The Marshall Plan was instrumental in establishing the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC), as it was the recipient of Marshall Plan aid that signed 
the Convention establishing the OEEC on 16
th
. April, 1948 (Führer, 1996, p. 5). Since 
the aid provided by the Marshall Plan was directed to developed states (European 
countries devastated by the World War II), it does not fall within the scope of 
development aid that will be covered in this dissertation, as the primary aim is to assess 
development aid from developed to developing countries. The success of the Marshall 
Plan may be accredited to its responsibility towards the reconstruction of European 
economies that already possessed valuable human capital, as opposed to the developing 
countries of the periphery. This aid provided an additional impetus for already 
industrialised countries of the West to merely reconstruct their economies after the war, 
thus differentiating from the development aid provided by the Marshall Plan and the 
development aid provided to developing and/or less-developed countries (LDCs) today 
(Rothermund, 2006, p. 267). 
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During his inaugural address in January 1949, U.S. President Harry Truman raised the 
idea of technical assistance, thus launching the idea of the expanded technical assistance 
program (Jolly et al., 2004, p. 68). This resulted in the creation of the United Nations 
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) in 1950 (Bhourasker, 2007, p. 
195). The EPTA was designed to facilitate the transfer of expertise to developing states 
through the UN (Jolly et al., 2004, p. 68). With increased pressure from the U.S., 
governments of the wealthier countries of Europe and Japan established aid agencies 
and increased their levels of development aid in the mid 1950s. This is not to mean that 
these countries did not have established aid agencies, they were just different from those 
of the U.S. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the independence of many colonies. Both 
France and Britain provided aid to their former colonies, in part to meet real economic 
needs of their former colonies, to ensure that independence went smoothly and also to 
ensure that Britain and France maintained some sort of influence over these newly 
independent countries (Lancaster, 2007, p. 150).  
Uneasy diplomatic relations between the West and the Soviet Union also marked the 
1950s.Cold War politics increasingly became the dominant factor in foreign aid and 
policies. Foreign aid was used as a means to support and strengthen relations between 
states that shared an ideological bond, and where geopolitical interests were involved 
economic and military support would often follow. During this period foreign aid was 
characterised by its “tied” nature, as it primarily consisted of purchasing specific goods 
and services from the donor country (Goldin, 2009, p. 43). When aid is said to be “tied” 
this means that a portion of the money goes back to the country of origin (Sheppard,et 
al., 2009, p. 566). Tied aid can take many forms. Sheppard et al. (2009, p. 566) give the 
following examples: “(...) the construction of a dam in Kenya may require the 
purchasing of Land Rovers to use in the project; Japanese aid for developing an iron 
mine in Indonesia may require the use of Japanese building materials and geologists.” 
Another key characteristic of this period was the increasing prevalence of food aid. 
This, in part, was a reflection of increasingly higher agricultural subsidies in Western 
Europe, the United States, and Japan. These rich countries were able to protect their 
markets from competitive imports and subsidise their farmers. The outcome of these 
countries’ agricultural policies was the production of huge surpluses that were supplied 
into the world market, often as food aid (Goldin, 2009, pp. 43-44). Food aid is a 
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tangible form of aid, which is purchased by the donor government from its farmers and 
food corporations. Since the purchase of food for aid is made in the donor country, food 
aid can be classified as a special form of tied aid. Food aid can reduce the recipient 
country’s hunger in the short-term, but has long-term consequences as it undermines 
domestic agriculture in the recipient country since farmers are unable to compete with 
free imported food, therefore reducing their production of domestic food crops 
(Sheppard et al., 2009, p. 566). 
According to Fig. 2.1, the 1960s witnessed a rise in bilateral aid. This rise may be 
attributed to increased bilateral aid programmes by many European countries – friends 
and allies of the United States – and to the establishment of official aid agencies to 
manage them (Lancaster, 2007, p.31). Such bilateral initiatives were designed to 
provide aid flows and technical assistance to developing countries. In 1960 Canada 
created an External Aid Office, in 1961 the United States created the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), France established a Ministry for 
Cooperation, Japan created the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, and the 
government of Germany set up a development bank, the Reconstruction Credit Institute 
(Goldin, 2009, p. 43). Socialist countries also became significant aid donors, and like 
much of the Western aid the socialist bloc aid was driven by diplomatic concerns. The 
major contributors of the socialist bloc aid were the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic 
(USSR) and the People’s Republic of China. Three-quarters of Soviet aid went to 
communist developing countries to stabilize and subsidize their economies. Friendly 
non-communist states (India, Egypt and Syria) received socialist aid predominantly 
towards aid projects involving infrastructure, mining and education (Lancaster, 2007, 
pp. 31-32). The year 1960 was equally important for the OEEC, as it signed the 
Convention reconstituting it as the OECD. 
Fig. 2.1 (in contrast to Fig. 2.2) shows bilateral aid flows to be considerably more than 
those of a multilateral nature. By the mid-1960s bilateral aid accounted for 95 per cent 
of total ODA as compared to just 5 percent for multilateral aid. Almost all multilateral 
technical assistance in the 1960s was channelled through the UN and its specialised 
agencies. The largest distributor of technical assistance was the EPTA (Kapoor, 2008 
p.92). The increase in foreign aid did not seem to translate into to the hopes of increased 
economic growth in the recipient states. The success of the Marshall Plan could not be 
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replicated, which meant that developing states would not be able to repay aid with 
higher exports. New policy priorities began to emerge (Linbarger, 2008, p. 19). 
2.3.2. Development Aid: A New Emphasis (1970s, 1980s) 
The beginning of the 1970s marked a new era for development aid. The initial focus on 
economic growth and modernization was replaced by a greater emphasis on poverty and 
basic human needs. This change was due to an initiative of the World Bank and the 
International Labour Office (Linebarger, 2008, p. 20). DAC members adopted in 1977 a 
“Statement on development Co-operation for Economic Growth and Meeting Basic 
Human Needs” related with basic human needs. According to Führer (1996, p. 30), “(...) 
in this statement DAC Members emphasise that concern with meeting basic human 
needs is not a substitute for, but an essential component of, more economic growth.” 
Two trends emerged in the 1970s: with the first oil shock and falling commodity prices, 
quick disbursing assistance was introduced and made available by the IMF; and the 
emergence of import support aid. According to Fig. 2.1 there was a slight decrease in 
bilateral aid, which can be linked to the oil crisis of the 1970s. This decrease in foreign 
aid was short-lived as ODA began to rise again in the latter half of the 1970s. This in 
part was attributed to the increase in aid from oil exporting countries (Linebarger, 2008, 
p. 21). The multilateralism of aid became more pronounced in the 1970s, which can be 
seen in line with the increase of aid in Fig. 2.2, while donors – notably the World Bank 
– gravitated towards a greater focus on poverty reduction (Tarp and Hjertholm, 2000, 
pp. 82-83). 
The DAC of the OECD also made major efforts towards untying multilateral aid, as the 
DAC was becoming increasingly concerned with the problems arising from 
procurement tying of aid (Führer, 1996, p. 22). The rise of oil prices triggered an 
important change: members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) become major donors of development aid (Carbone, 2007, p. 69). OPEC and 
multilateral aid agencies became significant sources of foreign assistance – primarily 
through grant form – to developing countries of the Middle East and Africa. Foreign 
aid, in particular bilateral aid, became less associated with the Cold War and more so 
relations between developed and developing countries (Lancaster, 2007, pp. 33-34). 
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The 1980s witnessed a renewed emphasis on the evaluation of aid effectiveness, and by 
1981 the DAC established a Group of Correspondents on Aid Evaluation.  
The DAC was also concerned with the role of women in development, and in 1981 
established a Correspondents Group on Women in Development (Führer, 1996, pp. 34-
35). During the 1980sit became increasingly evident that foreign aid was not producing 
the developmental outcomes that it was expected to, and as a result policy-makers began 
to focus on development aid as a tool to fulfil basic human needs and to alleviate 
poverty. Therefore structural adjustment conditionality
5
 became usual throughout the 
1980s (Linebarger, 2008, pp. 21-40). 
The World Bank was at the forefront of the conditionality principle linked to structural 
adjustment programs (Tarp and Hjertholm, 2000, p. 83), leading up to the PRSPs from 
1999 (Browne, 2006, p. 45). According to the World Bank, the PRSPs are broad 
development planning documents that describe countries’ “(...) macroeconomic, 
structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty.” 
(Lancaster, 2007, p. 53) As suggested by Sumner and Mallett (2013, p. 16), PRSPs “(...) 
aim to build better donor-recipient partnerships and integrate civil society more 
effectively into the policy process.” By the second half of the 1980s the deteriorating 
conditions of many poor countries led DAC states to conclude that structural adjustment 
conditionality had failed. This decade also began to witness the increasing role of NGOs 
in the distribution of aid (Linebarger, 2008, p. 41). 
2.3.3. A Decade of Important Changes (1990s) 
The 1990s was a decade of important changes. The world witnessed the end of the Cold 
War as well as some significant changes in the foreign aid arena. Lancaster 2007 (pp. 
44-48) highlights four major events that changed the landscape of foreign aid: the end 
of the Cold War; democratisation; globalisation; and economic problems in countries 
that usually were donors of development aid. According to Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2 the 
early 1990s saw an increase in both bilateral and multilateral aid. The decline in 
tensions brought about by the competing ideologies of the Cold War gave way to the 
idealistic sentiment of democratic principles, ushering in the short-lived era of ‘aid for 
                                                          
5
 According to Browne (2004, p. 19), structural adjustment conditionality in development aid policies of 
the 1980s can be described as, “(...) the demand for developing countries to implement processes of 
macroeconomic reform as a condition for the provision of aid”. 
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democracy’ (Linebarger, 2008, p. 23). This has often been referred to as the “third 
wave” of democracy and proved to be a useful tool for promoting democracy, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Lancaster, 2007, p. 47). 
Globalisation played an increasingly prominent role during the 1990s. Globalization 
increased the impact of human activity on a global scale. The ideas of a global 
community and of global citizens became ever more present through the forces that 
eroded national boundaries, and became manifest in economic, social, cultural, political, 
technological, or even biological dimensions, as in the case of disease (Goldin and 
Reinert, 2007, p. 2). Globalisation facilitated the spread of problems across borders by 
creating an awareness of the difficulties faced in distant places, including civil conflict, 
poverty, environmental challenges, and problems of disease, especially HIV/AIDS 
(Lancaster, 2007, p. 46). As a result, development assistance fell rapidly and 
humanitarian aid expanded. In the 1990s, a different approach of international 
cooperation emerged, arguing that too much aid created a dependency situation that 
retarded development (Linebarger, 2008, p. 23).  
The second half of the 1990s began to witness a decrease in the amounts of 
development aid (see Fig.2.1 and Fig. 2.2). These temporary shortfalls could be 
accredited to the economic problems within donor countries (Lancaster, 2007, p. 47). It 
was accompanied by the rethinking of development goals in the late 1990s, which 
gravitated towards the elimination of poverty by improving education, health and other 
human capacities (Goldin, 2009, p. 44). This decade also introduced “second 
generation” conditionality and by the end of the decade the groundwork had been laid 
for a renewed focus upon poverty and a dramatic expansion of ODA (Linebarger, 2008, 
pp. 23-24). With development aid’s inability to promote development, particularly in 
Africa, numerous writings on aid effectiveness began to surface (often criticisms of aid 
ineffectiveness). This led to a series of reforms implemented by aid agencies to better 
achieve their development missions. 
In 1996, the IMF and the World Bank launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative
6
. The aim of the HIPC initiative is “(...) to ensure that no poor country 
                                                          
6
According to the IMF (2013, pp. 1-2), the following conditions need to be fulfilled in order to be 
considered for HIPC Initiative assistance:  
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
18 
 
faces a debt burden it cannot manage.” (IMF, 2013, p. 1)The HIPC Initiative was 
endorsed by the Group Seven (G-7) countries in Cologne in July 1999. It was then 
approved by the IMF and World Bank as an integral part of the new poverty reduction 
strategy initiative (World Bank, 2001, p. 201). Other initiatives included results-based 
management, selectivity, PRSPs, and sector-wide approaches (SWAp) to aid-giving 
countries (Lancaster, 2007, pp. 50-51). 
TABLE 2.1. Schematic Overview Of The Main Developments In The History Of 
Foreign Aid 
Dominant or 
Rising 
institutions  
Donor ideology Donor focus Types of aid   
1940’s  The Marshall Plan 
and the UN 
System (including 
World Bank, IMF 
and GATT) 
Planning Reconstruction  Marshall Plan was 
largely 
programme aid 
1950s  Unites States with 
the Soviet Union 
gaining 
importance from 
1956 onwards 
Anti-communist, 
but with a role 
forthe state. 
Community 
Development 
Movement. 
Food aid and 
projects. 
1960s Establishment of 
bilateral 
programmes 
As for the 1950s 
with support for 
state in productive 
sectors  
Productive sectors 
(e.g. support to the 
green revolution) 
and infrastructure. 
Bilaterals gave 
technical 
assistance (TA) 
and budget 
support: 
multilaterals 
supported 
projects. 
1970s Expansion of 
multilaterals 
(especially World 
Bank, IMF and 
Arab-funded 
agencies) 
Ongoing support 
for state activities 
in productive 
activities and 
meeting basic 
needs. 
Poverty taken as 
agriculture and 
basic needs (social 
sectors). 
Fall in food aid 
and start of import 
support. 
1980s  Rise of NGOs 
from mid-1980s 
onwards 
Market-based 
adjustment 
(rolling back the 
state). 
Macroeconomic 
reform. 
Financial 
programme aid 
and debt relief. 
1990s Eastern Europe 
and Former Soviet 
Unionbecame 
recipients rather 
than donors: 
Move back to the 
state towards end 
of the decade. 
Poverty and then 
governance 
(environment and 
gender passed 
more quickly). 
Move towards 
sector approach at 
end of decade. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
i. “Be eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s International Development Agency, and from the 
IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust; 
ii. Face an unsustainable debt burden that cannot be addressed through traditional debt relief 
mechanisms; 
iii. Have an established track record of reform and sound policies through IMF and World Bank 
support programs; and 
iv. Have developed a PRSP through broad-based participatory process in the country.” 
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
19 
 
emergence of 
corresponding 
institutions. 
Source: Adapted from Hjertholm and White (2000, p. 81). 
2.4. The Contemporary Architecture of International Aid  
The history of development cooperation is a living evidence of the ever-changing nature 
of development aid thinking and the methods through which aid has been delivered. 
This delivery is provided through a variety of modalities such as project, sector and 
budget support (OECD, 2006b, p. 19). According the Maxwell (2003, pp. 5-6) the 
contemporary international aid architecture consists of the following five elements: 
i. The MDGs, with poverty reduction at their heart; 
ii. International consensus on how to reduce poverty, best summarised in the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2000/1: Attacking Poverty; 
iii. A mechanism for operationalising the strategy at a country level, in PRSPs; 
iv. Technologies for delivering aid support of PRSPs, notably medium-term expenditure framework, 
SWAps and poverty reduction support credits, all associated with budget support rather than project 
funding; and 
v. Underpinning the other four, a commitment to results-based management.   
The series of commitments made at the United Nations Millennium Summit, which 
endorsed the United Nations Millennium Declaration, served as a commitment to a new 
global partnership to reduce extreme poverty. The MDGs reflect the contemporary aid 
architecture and the dramatic paradigm shift in development thinking. This paradigm 
shift is not only evident in an increased amount of aid, it is also concerned with aid’s 
improved effectiveness (Cassimon and van Campenhout, 2007, p. 742). The MDGs 
have since become a framework to guide policies and programmes in the international 
community. According to Schabbel (2007, p. 110), “(...) the MDGs differ from previous 
initiatives because they have been negotiated at the level of head of states and gathered 
worldwide support.” 
This support was further entrenched by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 
the following statement (OECD, 2005c, p. 1): 
(w)e, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and Heads 
of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, meeting in Paris on 2 March 2005, resolve to take 
far reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to 
the UN five-year review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals. 
The second element pointed out by Maxwell (2003) is the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2000/1: Attacking Poverty. This report outlines actions that will 
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serve as “drivers” of development: Promoting Opportunity by expanding economic 
opportunity for poor people; Facilitating Empowerment, by making state institutions 
more accountable and responsive to poor people; and Enhancing Security by reducing 
poor people’s vulnerability (World Bank, 2001, p. vi). 
The third element is PRSPs. The World Bank adopted them in 1999 to improve the 
effectiveness of development aid. PRSPs are broad development planning documents. 
These documents were, and still are, increasingly used by aid agencies worldwide as 
guidelines to development financing in poor countries (Lancaster, 2007, p. 54). 
According to the World Banks definition of PRSPs (World Bank, 2001, p. 8), “(...) 
PRSP sets out a country’s macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs 
to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs.” 
Maxwell’s fourth element refers to the technologies for delivering aid support of 
PRSPs, SWAp
7
. According to the (OECD, 2006a, p. 37) the SWAp and sector 
development programmes are linked to a broader concept of programme-based 
approaches, which are defined as follows: 
(a) way of engaging in development co-operation based on the principle of co-ordinated support for a 
locally owned programme of development, such as national poverty reduction strategy, a sector 
programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a specific organisation. 
Governments are therefore encouraged to produce medium-term expenditure 
frameworks, whereas donors are encouraged to work together in support of SWAps 
(Maxwell, 2003, p. 10). Maxwell’s final element is the commitment to results-based 
management or performance management. As part of their efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of aid, the donor community has increasingly focused on the measurement 
of development results, the impact of their activities, and establishing the extent to 
which these results can be attributed to specific development activities (OECD 2005b, 
p. 114). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shed some light on some of the developments that have occurred 
throughout the history of development cooperation since 1940 to 2010. The journey of 
development cooperation began with an emphasis on economic growth during the 1940s 
                                                          
7
 The OECD states that a SWAp focuses government and donor support on a comprehensive sector 
development programme (OECD, 2006a, p. 36). 
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to 1960s, and gradually gravitated towards poverty reduction during the 1980s to 2010. 
What has been made increasingly clear is that the nature of development cooperation 
has expanded and encompasses not only the economic aspects of development but also 
social aspects (such a human development),as well as the political dimension, with 
greater emphasis on governance.  
Throughout its history development cooperation has faced new challenges on a decade 
basis, and what has become clear is that developmental success for one state/region will 
not necessarily translate to the developmental success of all. This was evident in the 
booming years of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s and the unsuccessful levels of 
development throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. This resulted in greater concerns 
about the effectiveness of development aid as well as a greater emphasis on poverty 
reduction as a primary goal to achieve sustained development. The 1990s became a 
symbolic decade of reform as many donors and aid agencies set out to better achieve 
their development goals. The reforms of the late 1990s gave way to the international 
contemporary aid architecture of the 21
st.
 century, with poverty reduction at its core 
bound by achieving the MDGs that serve as a guideline to achieve poverty reduction, 
and are the backbone of the international contemporary aid architecture. In order to 
ensure the success of the MDGs a commitment by both donors and the recipients of aid 
to PRSPs, SWAp, and results-based management is of the utmost importance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
22 
 
III. Theoretical Framework  
Introduction 
This chapter aims at creating a better understanding of the importance of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Section 3.1 provides the theoretical framework. In this section 
relevant theories of international relations are explored in their relation with 
development aid. Section 3.2 explores the trajectory towards facilitating and 
strengthening the aid effectiveness agenda in the 21
st.
 century through several High 
Level Forums including the Paris Declaration. Section 3.3 attempts to briefly describe 
the five core principles of the Paris Declaration as it leads to Section 3.4. Finally, 
Section 3.4, “The Paris Declaration: Against its Struggles”, assesses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Paris Declaration.  
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
Theories of International Relations assist us in understanding the interactions among 
states within the international community, including power politics and the motives for 
states’ actions in the international arena. Theories of International Relations also 
provide the basis for understanding the motives and the interests behind development 
cooperation, particularly in the modern context of an increasingly interdependent world. 
There are a variety of theories to consider and it is important to note that no single 
theory is absolute, as each theory represents a unique perspective on the interactions 
among states and the several actors within the international community
8
. Traditional 
theories of International Relations may also be applied to foreign assistance – which 
includes, but is not limited to, development aid. According to Van Belle (2000, p. 108), 
foreign aid distributions can be explained in the context of, “(...)realism and a strategic 
motive, globalism and an economic motive, or pulralism and a humanitarian motive”.  
3.1.1. Realism 
Realism is considered one of the oldest theories of International Relations. The realist 
approach gained its prominence during the first half of the 20
th.
 century due to the First 
World War and the Second World War. During this period, it became increasingly easy 
                                                          
8
Note that the theories of development aid include, but are not limited to, the theories and theorists 
discussed in this chapter. 
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to find evidence of the basic realist views and assumptions as states pursued destructive 
foreign policy objectives that supported conflict, rather than cooperation (Jackson and 
Sørensen, 2007, p. 37). Realism’s domination during the interwar period placed great 
emphasis on the central role of power politics and the pursuit of national interests 
(Heywood, 2002, p. 128). According to Jackson and Sørensen (2007, p. 60) the basic 
realist ideas and assumptions are: 
i. A pessimistic view of human nature; 
ii. A conviction that international relations are necessarily conflictive and that 
international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war; 
iii. A high regard for the values of national security; and  
iv. A basic scepticism that there can be progress in international politics that is 
comparable to that in domestic political life. 
Jackson and Sørensen (2007, p. 60) argue that “(i)n realist thought humans are 
characterized as being preoccupied with their own well-being in their competitive 
relations with one another.” From a realist perspective development aid is, according to 
Liska (1960, p. 15) (cit. In Van Belle, 2000, p. 108) “(...) inseparable from the problem 
of power.” In this regard, aid programs facilitate the interests of the donor rather than of 
the recipient state. This is not to say that humanitarian motives for development 
assistance are dismissed, it just places donors’ political influence, military security, and 
trade objectives as the primary concern (Van Belle, 2000, p. 108).  
3.1.2. Liberalism  
In contrast to the pessimistic realist assumption of international relations, liberalism has 
a somewhat positive view of human nature, with a core assumption in the belief in 
progress (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, pp. 98-99). Liberal thinking is closely connected 
with the emergence of the modern constitutional state. However, it is neo-liberalism, a 
variant of liberal international relations theory, which is most applicable when 
describing cooperation among states (Sheppard et al., 2009, p. 95). The central concern 
of neo-liberalism is based on an idea of how to best achieve cooperation among states 
and other actors in the international system (Sterling-Folker, 2007, p. 117). The 
neoliberal perspective is closely linked to that of pluralism (Sterling-Folker, 2007, p. 
118). Pluralists argued that a variety of non-state actors and processes were breaking 
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down barriers between domestic and international affairs (Sterling-Folker, 2007, p. 
117). It is from a pluralist perspective that Van Belle (2000, p. 111) argues that, 
“(d)ecisions on aid should instead be guided by transnational humanitarian concerns.”In 
its practical application, neoliberalism’s initial focus was, according to Sheppard et al. 
(2009, p. 96) on “(…) changing domestic and local markets in order to “liberalise” 
markets.” This thinking, however, increasingly became associated with globalisation 
(Sheppard et al., 2009, p. 96).  
3.1.3. Globalisation 
There is no one commonly accepted definition of globalisation, and if anything, 
globalisation is a debate about what is understood by the term, and not entirely on how 
it is defined (Hay, 2007, p. 280). In international relations’ theory, the globalisation 
debate has pitted realist/neorealist “sceptics” against neoliberal/cosmopolitan 
“globalists” (Hay, 2009, p. 282). The potential indicators of globalisation are, according 
to Hay (2007, p. 285), the following:  
i. A cross-border flows of goods, investment and information;  
ii. Transnational processes of political deliberation and decision-making;  
iii. Close interdependence between states; 
iv. The development of a world system whose dynamic and development trajectory 
is not the simple outcome of the units (states) which comprise it; 
v. The proliferation of problems to which global solutions are required; 
vi. The development of institutions charged with the responsibility for fashioning 
genuinely global public policy. 
From the neoliberal perspective, according to Sheppard et al. (2009, p. 96), 
“(g)lobalisation has replaced development as the framework within which to think about 
the trajectory of change in the third world.” From this perspective, Van Belle (2000, p. 
108) argues that foreign assistance is driven by an economic motive and is based on the 
assumption of “(...) economic wealth and the function of trans-national capital flows”, 
and that “aid is not given to enhance the recipient country, or to obtain strategic goals, 
but instead to facilitate economic exploitation by the donor.” However, those in favour 
of globalisation suggest, from a neoliberal approach, that rather than exploitation, free 
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trade and international investments can increase the standards of living in all countries, 
in particular developing countries (Boyes and Melvin, 2007, p. 441).  
3.1.4. The Motives behind Development Assistance  
There are several motives for providing development assistance. Thirlwall (1989, pp. 
319-321) groups these motives into three headings:   
i. The moral, humanitarian motive to assist poor countries, and particularly poor 
people in poor countries; 
ii. Political, military and historical motives for granting assistance; and  
iii. Economic motives for developed countries investing in developing countries, 
not only to raise the growth rate of the developing countries, but also in their 
own self-interest to raise their own welfare, in which case international 
assistance can be mutually profitable. 
Development assistance can be characterised by motives of self-interest from both the 
donors’ and the recipient states. This mutual, and yet asymmetrical relationship of 
dependence involves, according to Picard and Groelsema (2008, p. 12), “(f)rom the 
recipients’ perspective (…) opportunity costs to foregoing foreign aid.” According to 
Picard and Groelsema (2008, p. 12), “(l)eaders in recipient states often ‘have had private 
interests and ambitions of their own’”. This mutually beneficial, yet asymmetrical 
relationship between donors’ and recipients’ states is more than often a vehicle of the 
formers’ foreign policy objectives (Picard and Groelsema, 2008, p. 12).   
The moral, humanitarian motive: the basis for this argument is the idea that an 
individual who is financially well off has the obligation to help the poor and/or 
impoverished. This same moral obligation provides the basis for the relations between 
rich/developed countries, and poor/LDCs and developing countries (Degnbøl-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2005, p. 10). However, in the international foreign 
aid debate the line between moral and humanitarian argument is somewhat blurred by a 
motive that is frequently combined with some form of self-interest (Degnbøl-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2005, p. 10).    
Political, military, and historical motives: according to Alesina and Dollar (2000, p. 
33), “(t)he pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations.” 
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
26 
 
With regard to “political and strategic considerations,” Alesina and Dollar stress 
considerations that are historically rooted in former colonies. Countries such as the 
United Kingdom and France have had the tendency to concentrate their assistance to ex- 
colonial territories (Thirlwall, 1989, p. 319). More than often the recipients of this aid 
do not display the necessary conditions for receiving such aid (good policy, good 
governance, democratic institutions, strong rule of law, and others). They also fail to 
effectively manage the use of such aid, and yet, according to Alesina and Dollar (2000, 
p. 33) they receive more foreign aid than other countries with “(...)a similar level of 
poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony.” This is a reflection of 
the strong historical ties, and perhaps a moral obligation for former colonial neglect and 
exploitation. The political and military alliance is greatly linked to military aid. 
According to Degnbøl-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2005, p. 12), “(i)ndustrial 
countries in particular have administered and distributed a large part of their 
development assistance in accordance with political and national security priorities.”   
Economic motives: developed countries invest in developing counties in order to raise 
their growth rate. But it can also be said that such investments are motivated by 
developed countries’ self-interest to raise their own welfare in what is labelled as a 
mutual, yet asymmetrical profitability (Thirlwall, 1989, p. 320). According to Thirlwall, 
(1989, p. 320) this can be mutually profitable if two conditions are met:   
i. The interest rate on loans is higher than the productivity of capital in developed 
countries and lower than the productivity of capital in developing countries; 
ii. If there are underutilised resources in developed countries, which could not 
otherwise be activated because of balance-of-payments constraints. International 
assistance will be mutually profitable through an increase of resources towards 
developing countries and a fuller utilisation of resources in developed countries. 
A counter-argument to Thirlwall’s Keynesian approach stems from the globalists’ 
critique. Aid is given to the detriment of the recipient country as it is used to facilitate 
an exploitative economic relationship between the donor and the recipient state, as 
donors are able to exercise influence over development strategies of the recipient 
country (Van Belle, 2000, p. 108).  
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3.1.5. Theories of Aid and Development 
According to Riddell (1987, p. 85) theories of aid and development fulfil two distinctive 
functions: 
(t)he main function of a pro-aid theory is clearly to put forward an explanation of how aid contributes to 
development, but it also carries with it an implicit rejection of any theory of development that does not 
give a role to aid in accelerating development: why aid helps development is thus assumed in the 
theoretical explanation of how it does so. The arguments of alternative theories concluding either that aid 
is not necessary or that other means of achieving development could be better or simply not addressed. 
Two key assumptions are made: that aid constitutes additional resources, and that these are important for 
accelerating development. Given these assumptions, it is immediately apparent that foreign aid theory 
has to place strong emphasis on the need of intervention in promoting development and on the belief that 
more resources lead to greater development.  
The study of economic development can help to better understand the nature and causes 
of poverty in low-income countries, and the transformation of societies from being 
primarily rural to being primarily industrial (Thirlwall, 1989, p. 9). Conventional aid 
theory has its roots in Keynesian economics, particularly theories of economic growth 
that are modelled after the industrialised economies of the West (Riddell, 1987, p. 86). 
The post World-War II liberal international economic order holds, at its core, the 
significance of modernisation theories. Modernisation is based on the premise that 
nations can move from “traditional societies” at one extreme, to “modern” societies, at 
the other. In order for this transition to occur, “traditional” societies need to adopt the 
characteristics of “modern” societies. Perhaps the most influential theorist of 
modernisation is Walt Rostow (1960) (Sheppard et al., 2009, p. 70). Rostow envisioned 
five stages through which a “traditional” society would pass through in order to reach 
maturity: traditional; transitional/ preconditions for take-off; take-off; maturity; and 
high mass consumption (Thirlwall, 1989, p. 60)
9. Rostow’s first stage (“traditional” 
society) is characterised by limited production and productivity, a heavily agricultural 
society, with a hierarchical social and political structure (Sheppard et al., 2009, p. 71). It 
is in Rostow’s preconditions for take-off10 that he states that “(p)reconditions generally 
come from ‘external intrusions’” (Sheppard et al., 2009, p. 71). 
Rostow and other modernisation theorists have two main weaknesses. First, no attempt 
has been made to explain why external changes occur to which the social system then 
                                                          
9
 Appendix 4 offers a table listing and describing the characteristics of Rostow’s stages of economic 
growth.  
10Refer to appendix 4 for further information on the “preconditions for take-off” stage.  
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respond, and second, the phenomena that is supposed to ensure societal reproduction is 
established through the observation of “modern” societies rather than deduced from the 
analysis of other possibilities (Sheppard et al., 2009, p. 73). Despite its weaknesses, 
Rostow’s theory goes beyond the traditional notion on how aid assists development. He 
argued that, with time, aid will no longer be necessary. Aid is only needed for the period 
before take-off. After this period, “the supplying countries can look forward to a time 
when extraordinary measures to obtain capital from outside can be discontinued.” 
(Riddell, 1987, p. 88) 
Besides Rostow, Rodenstein-Rodan, Chenery and Strout, Harrod-Domar, and others 
also contributed to the theories of development aid. Rodenstein-Rodan placed great 
emphasis on the conditions necessary for recipient states to experience an effective pace 
of economic development. They also emphasised the purpose of aid to underdeveloped 
countries as to accelerate economic development to the point when growth will 
achieved on a self-sustaining basis (Riddell, 1987, p. 91). The transition to self-
sustaining economic growth, according to Rodenstein-Rodan(1961, p. 107), requires 
that “capital aid should be offered wherever there is reasonable assurance that it will be 
effectively used.” The contributions of aid, according to Chenery and Strout (1966, p. 
680), are to relieve specific bottlenecks inhibiting domestic growth and development, 
“and in fulfilling this role it increases the efficiency of the domestic resource base.”   
3.2. Aid effectiveness  
By the 1960s, concerns surrounding the effectiveness of aid triggered the creation of the 
DAC (Führer, 1996, pp. 8-9). As development partners tried to establish ways in which 
they could assess development efforts and results, in 1962 the DAC launched its Annual 
Aid Reviews of the Development Assistance Efforts and Policies (Aid Reviews). By 
1966, efforts to improve aid coordination were conveyed in the DACs Guidelines for 
Coordination of Technical Assistance (Führer, 1996, pp. 15-18). However, it was the 
1980’s that brought about a new emphasis on the evaluation of aid effectiveness and by 
1986 the DAC adopted principles for aid coordination (Führer, 1996, p. 45).  
The past decade has witnessed an increase in the momentum surrounding aid 
effectiveness, and has seen the development of an international framework in which 
donors and partner states have agreed to make the necessary efforts towards the 
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
29 
 
effectiveness of aid. In turn, the efforts made to increase the effectiveness of aid have 
also peaked donors’ interest in development effectiveness. As different as the terms aid 
effectiveness and development effectiveness may be, many analysts and aid agencies 
fail to make a distinction between the two, and in some cases the terms are used 
interchangeably (Kindornay and Morton, 2009, pp. 1-2). When defining development 
effectiveness one can make two distinctions. According to Stern et al. (2008, pp. 20-21) 
development assistance may be defined as:  
i. the achievement of sustainable development results related to the MDGs that 
have country-level impacts and discernable effects on the lives of the poor; 
and/or 
ii. the capability of states and other development actors to transform societies in 
order to achieve positive and sustainable development outcomes for its citizens. 
According to Stern et al. (2008, p. 20) aid effectiveness may be defined as the “(...) 
arrangement for the planning, management and deployment of aid that is efficient, 
reduces transaction costs and is targeted towards development outcomes including 
poverty reduction.” 
3.2.1. Towards Aid effectiveness  
The historical journey that led to a greater emphasis on aid effectiveness has brought 
together several efforts made by the donor community and partner states. On the 21
st
. 
and the 22
nd
. March 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, donor states committed themselves to 
building a greater international consensus on how to best tackle the objective of more 
effective aid. Thus, they made the commitment to significantly increase the percentage 
of ODA as a proportion of donor gross national income (GNI) from 0,22% in 2001 to an 
increased 0,29% by 2006 (Manning, 2004, p. 21). The Monterrey Consensus committed 
donors and partners to “(...) mobilising and increasing the effective use of financial 
resources”, in order to achieve the development goals contained in the Millennium 
Declaration (UN, 2003, p. 5). Point 40 of the Monterrey Consensus emphasised a new 
partnership between developed and developing countries in order for the internationally 
agreed upon development goals – the MDGs – to be achieved. The Consensus (UN, 
2003, p. 14) states that this “new partnership” will be based on a framework in which 
donor and partner countries strive for an effective partnership based on 
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
30 
 
(t)he recognition of national leadership and ownership of development plans and, within that framework, 
sound policies and good governance at all levels to ensure ODA effectiveness (...). The goals, targets and 
commitments of the Millennium Declaration and other internationally agreed development targets can 
help countries to set short-and medium-term national priorities as a foundation for building partnerships 
for external support. 
Building on the momentum of the Monterrey Consensus, a series of High Level Forums 
on the effectiveness of aid have shaped the first decade of the 21
st.
 century: the 2003 
Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, and the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation. 
3.2.2. From Rome to Paris, Accra and Busan  
Improvements in the effectiveness of aid do not just fall on the partner states and are not 
solely the reflection of increased amounts of aid from donor states. Emphasis has also 
been placed on how much aid should be delivered and the way in which aid is being 
delivered. The first High–Level Forum on aid effectiveness, The Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization, was held in Rome, on the 25
th
. February, 2003. Continuing the agenda 
of the Monterrey Consensus, the need to increase the effective use of financial resources 
was a major area of concern during the Rome Declaration (World Bank, 2003, p. 1), by 
stating that: 
(w)e the donor community have been concerned with the growing evidence that, over time, the totality 
and wide variety of donor requirements and processes for preparing, delivering, and monitoring 
development assistance are generating unproductive transaction costs for, and drawing down the limited 
capacity of, partner countries. We are also aware of partner country concerns that donors’ practices do 
not always fit well with national development priorities and systems, including their budget, program, 
and project planning cycles and public expenditure and financial management systems. We recognise that 
these issues require urgent, coordinated, and sustained action to improve our effectiveness on the ground.   
Improving donors’ performance is just as important as ensuring strong partner 
ownership of development policies and strategies. Endorsed by the Rome Declaration, 
the DAC Task Force on Donor Practices developed a Best Practices Guide in 2003 to 
guide and improve donors’ performance and achieve increased aid effectiveness. The 
Best Practices Guide sets out to create a good institutional framework for aid 
coordination and donors’ cooperation by providing a set of guiding principles for all the 
good practices (OECD, 2003, p. 18). Although the DAC’s mandate is to provide 
guidance primarily for donors, it is also beneficial for partner countries when they 
design their development programmes (OECD, 2006, p. 19). This is important because 
donor’s ability to effectively adopt the guiding principles and good practices will 
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depend on the commitment and capacity of partner governments to improve donor’s 
coordination and aid effectiveness (OECD, 2003, p. 18). While this document puts 
forward practical guidelines on how donors can support partner country ownership by 
harmonising their procedures, and is applicable to all modalities of aid delivery, it is 
most relevant to project support (OECD, 2006, p. 18). 
The second High-Level Forum on aid effectiveness was held in Paris, on the 2
nd
. March 
2005. It reaffirmed the commitments made in Rome to harmonise and align aid 
delivery. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
11
 is part of a global commitment to 
reduce poverty, increase economic growth, achieve sustainable development, and attain 
the MDGs. According to Venter (2008, p. 20) the Paris Declaration provides a set of 
indicators that serve as “a road map for reforming the delivery and management of aid, 
with the aim of making aid more affective.”  
With the goal to strengthen the international framework for aid effectiveness the Paris 
Declaration (OECD, 2005a, pp. 3-8) outlines five fundamental Partnership 
Commitments/Indicators of Progress for aid effectiveness: 
i. Ownership: partner countries exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies and strategies, and coordinate development actions; 
ii. Alignment: donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures; 
iii. Harmonisation: donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and 
collectively effective;  
iv. Managing for Results: managing resources and improving decision-making 
results; and 
v. Mutual Accountability: donors and partners are accountable for development 
results. 
As illustrated by Fig. 3.1 – a pyramid representing the principles and commitments of 
the Paris Declaration – a great deal of emphasis is placed on the ownership of 
development priorities and strategies by partner countries as it is positioned at the top of 
the pyramid. Progress made towards the partner country development agenda is 
                                                          
11
Appendix 5 illustrates to what extent the targets set out during the Paris Declaration have been met. This 
information is from the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, in which a total of 78 countries 
and territories volunteered to participate, with targets to be achieved by 2010 (OECD, 2011, p. 15). 
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dependent on the successful ownership of development priorities. This will assist in 
strengthening the remaining principles and commitments, such as: alignment involves 
donors’ alignment with partners’ agendas and reliance on partners’ systems; this will 
assist in the harmonisation of donors’ efforts in aid delivery; as it ties in with the cross-
cutting nature of both Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability (Stern et al., 
2008, p. 2). 
Fig. 3.1. Pyramid Representing the Principles and commitments of the Paris 
Declaration 
 
Source: OECD (2011a, p. 18). 
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In the spirit of mutual accountability, donors and partner countries are committed to the 
continuous process of evaluating and measuring the progress towards aid effectiveness 
by 2010, using 12 indicators. Fig. 3.2. illustrates the indictors used for this assessment. 
Fig. 3.2. Paris Declaration Indicators of Progress 
 
Source: OECD (2006, p. 16). 
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The second volume of the DACs best practices guide came after the Paris Declaration 
with an aim of assisting the aid effectiveness model set out in the Paris Declaration. 
This volume primarily focuses on providing budget support and support to sector-wide 
approaches. In this regard, it places great importance to the relevance of public financial 
management issues for the two modalities of aid delivery (OECD, 2006, p. 18). The 
“best practices” is simply a guide, a point of reference to assist development agencies in 
all countries, and it establishes a benchmark for donors’ performances in partner 
counties and provides a transparent basis for donors’ accountability (OECD, 2006, p. 
18). 
The changes towards an intensified and more effective partnership between donors and 
partners, and the expected trajectory of the progress towards the implementation of the 
agenda set out in the Paris Declaration, have been somewhat slower than expected. 
According to the 2011 Report on Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, only 
one of the thirteen targets established for 2010 – coordinated technical cooperation – 
has been met on a global level (OECD, 2011a, p. 15). The Accra Agenda for Action 
held in Accra, Ghana, on the 4
th
. September 2008, was the third High-Level Forum on 
aid effectiveness as it set out to accelerate and deepen the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration. The Accra Agenda for Action stressed three major challenges: country 
ownership; building more effective and inclusive partnerships; and achieving 
development results (OECD, 2008, pp. 16-19).  
The Busan Partnership for Effective Development is the fourth and final High-Level 
Forum which took place in Busan, Korea, from the 29
th
. November to the 1
st
. December 
2011. The Busan Forum boasted a variety of stakeholders: parliamentarians, civil 
society organisations (CSOs), and representatives from the private sector and academia 
(OECD, 2011b, p. 10). Much progress needs to be made towards achieving the 
indicators set out by the Paris Declaration as only one out of thirteen indicators have 
been met. It was noted that more needed to be done to promote sustainable 
development, and that “deepening the aid effectiveness agenda would not suffice.” 
(OECD, 2011b, pp. 10-11) As a result, development effectiveness needs to be part of 
the agenda in which “(a)id should be used as a catalyst to leverage other development 
financing including trade, private investment, and domestic resources.” (OECD, 2011b, 
pp. 10-11) 
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3.3. Understanding the Principles of the Paris Declaration  
3.3.1. Ownership (the case for ownership) 
Ownership is perhaps the most important principle of the Paris Declaration. If properly 
adhered to, it forms the necessary foundation that will allow the remaining principles to 
function effectively. Ownership takes form in a national development strategy. The 
Paris Declaration has placed partner countries’ ownership of policies and programmes 
at the centre of the international agenda to make aid more effective. Country ownership 
was stressed as being key to accelerating the progress made towards the commitments 
made in Paris. Subsequently, the Accra Agenda urged developing countries 
governments to “take stronger leadership of their own development policies.” (OECD, 
2008, p. 16) The Accra Agenda marked an evolution on this consensus as it called for a 
more inclusive process of developing and implementing development policies and 
plans. Such a process should have governments work closely with parliamentarians, 
local governments and engage with CSOs to help foster the role of the society as broad 
owners of development efforts (OECD, 2011a, p. 29). 
The purpose of this paper was to assess the strides made by the Government of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland (GoS), and the donor community within Swaziland, towards 
achieving the goals set out by the Paris Declaration. However, the key assessment will 
be based on the ownership the GoS has taken with regard to its development policies, in 
particular those that prioritise poverty reduction. The NDS of the GoS is a long-term 
development strategy which spans over a twenty-five year period – from 1997 until 
2022 – within which short and medium-term development plans will be formulated 
(GoS, 1999a, p. 2). Within the NDS the medium-term development plans are articulated 
through the PRSAP for the 2005-2015. This will be discussed in further detail in the 
following chapter. 
3.3.2 Alignment  
Alignment is the process through which donors support partner countries’ national 
development strategies (OECD, 2005a, p. 3). As indicated on appendix 3, there are 
seven indicators that monitor the progress made towards this principle. Alignment 
allows for donors and partner countries to work together in establishing mutually agreed 
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upon frameworks that will encourage the improvement and the use of national systems 
and procedures, which include, but are not restricted to, national arrangements and 
procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results’ 
frameworks and monitoring (OECD, 2005a, p. 4). 
3.3.3. Harmonisation 
Under the Paris Declaration, the principle of harmonisation seeks to ensure that aid 
policies are more harmonised between donors within the partner country, and between 
partners and donors. The aim is for donors to work together in order to reduce the 
number of separate, duplicative missions in one country (OECD, 2005a, p. 6). To avoid 
fragmentation, donors and partners need to work together to harmonise separate 
procedures while it falls on partner countries to build strong institutions and to establish 
effective government structures that will encourage donors’ aid, and it falls on donors to 
harmonise their activities and make maximum use of recipients’ national systems 
(OECD, 2005a, pp. 6-7). 
3.3.4. Managing for Results 
This means “(...) managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired 
results and uses information to improve decision-making.” (OECD, 2005a, p. 7) Partner 
countries are committed to establishing results-orientated reporting and assessment 
frameworks that monitor progress, while donors are encouraged to work with partner 
countries and rely, as far as possible, to partner countries’ reporting and monitoring 
frameworks (OECD, 2005a, p. 7). 
3.3.5 Mutual Accountability  
As agreed upon in the Paris Declaration, this principle is centred upon a commitment 
made by both donors and partners towards shared and mutual accountability of 
development results. This implies that partner countries need to be committed to the 
process of formulating, assessing and adopting national policies that systematically 
involve a broad range of development partners (OECD, 2005a, p. 8). Donors need to 
provide timely and transparent information on aid flows (OECD, 2005a, p. 8). In 
essence this principle encapsulates all the principles represented in the Paris 
Declaration. 
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3.4. The Paris Declaration: Against its Strengths  
The Paris Declaration has received much support from donors and partners. This 
support is further entrenched with the goal of measuring the progress made towards the 
achievement of five core principles with twelve indicators by 2010. Against its 
strengths, this framework for aid effectiveness has its weaknesses. The United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC, 2008, p. 3) points out three weaknesses: 
i. the following areas established within the framework of the Paris Declaration 
could be improved: broadening the subjects covered by either adding more 
principles, or creating additional indicators; improving clarity, monitoring and 
comprehensiveness of the indicators established in the Paris Declaration; 
strengthening transparency and inclusiveness of monitoring and of mutual 
accountability; 
ii. The process that developed the Paris Declaration did not involve a full range of 
stakeholders. However, this weakness was somewhat addressed in the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development. Busan brought together the broadest 
range of stakeholders in international development, with over 3.000 participants. 
Several heads of states, ministers from 160 countries, heads of international 
organisations, parliamentarians, partners from CSOs, and representatives from 
the private sector and academia attended this meeting (OECD, 2011b, p. 10). 
Busan achieved what could what was lacking in Paris and Accra – an inclusive 
partnership.     
iii. The third concern is related with a possible overload with the procedures 
established in the Paris Declaration, which imposes transaction costs. These 
costs may not have a positive impact on sustainable development. As stated in 
the ECOSOC (2008, p. 4), 
(t)here is a need to demonstrate to political actors at top-level clear links between the issues of 
aid effectiveness and the broader issue of development effectiveness, in order to persuade 
politicians in both donor and recipient countries that it is their interests to change the business 
of aid in order to ensure sustainable development results. 
 
The links between development effectiveness and aid effectiveness were 
addressed in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development and made up the 
core of this fourth, and final High-Level Forum on aid effectiveness. According 
to the OECD (2011, p. 11), 
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(d)eepening the aid effectiveness agenda will not suffice to promote sustainable growth and 
development, and to respond to the rapidly changing world. To make development happen and 
enhance the impact of co-operation, there is a need to take a broader approach to development. 
The Paris Declaration has created an opportunity for both donors and partner countries 
to improve their ability to deliver and receive aid (Venter, 2008, p. 20). Yet, progress 
towards the commitments made in the Paris Delectation has been somewhat slow. As 
stated in Busan, in 2011 only one out of the thirteen indicators have been met (OECD, 
2011b, p. 10). In light of all the efforts made, has aid effectiveness improved? And, 
more importantly, to what extent have donors and, in particular, partner countries 
delivered on the Paris Declaration commitments? The latter question is what this 
dissertation intends to address. 
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IV. Swaziland in Context 
Introduction 
With the increasing emphasis on national ownership of development policies to improve 
the effectiveness of aid, it is important to gain some insight on Swaziland’s profile in 
order to better understand the country’s development challenges. This chapter aims at 
providing a brief introduction of Swaziland by outlining key historical, economic, 
social, and political events that are relevant for the purpose of this dissertation. Section 
4.1 outlines some of the historical events that have led to the creation of modern 
Swaziland. Section 4.2 discusses Swaziland’s economic and social improvement as well 
as the challenges of recent years, while section 4.3 examines the major social and socio-
economic developments, and section 4.4 looks at Swaziland’s political landscape.    
The Kingdom of Swaziland, also known as Ngwane, is a small landlocked country in 
South-Eastern Africa. Swaziland shares a border with the Republic of South Africa – to 
its North, West, and South – and the Republic of Mozambique, to its East. Swaziland 
covers a land area of 17.364 square kilometres, making of it, after Gambia, the smallest 
country in Africa. It is divided into four regions: Hhohho (North-West), Manzini 
(Central), Lubombo (East), and Shiselwini (South)
12
 (Davies et al., 1985, p. ix). 
Swaziland is the only country in SSA that has survived the independence period as a 
monarchy (Booth, 2000, p. 1). By SSA standards, Swaziland is a relatively wealthy 
nation, as measured by per capita gross national product (GNP). However, this wealth 
comes at the price of extreme political and social tension, caused by, in part, the 
widening gap between the rich and the poor (Booth, 2000, p. 1).   
4.1. History  
4.1.1. The Pre-Colonial Period 
The historical origins of the Swazi nation can be traced back to an estimated 2.500 years 
ago. Originally from the Niger Delta in West Africa, the Bantu-speaking people started 
to make their way South and Eastwards at an estimated 1.000 BC arriving in Southern 
Africa in small waves at around 500 AD. As a result of sporadic migration patterns of 
                                                          
12
See Appendix 6 for a map of Swaziland with the regions and cities. 
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Bantu speaking people, some groups – the ancestors of today’s Nguni people13 (Zulu, 
Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele) settled near the coast, rather than inland (Beck, 2000, p. 
16). The Swazi people (the Ngwaneor bakaNgwane) are Southern-Eastern Bantus, as 
they speak the siSwati, a dialect of the Nguni branch of the Bantu language group 
(Booth, 2000, pp. 3-4).  
It was during the early 19
th.
 century that the Ngwane moved further North into North-
Central Swaziland due to the violent upheavals, known as the Mfecane. According to 
Davies et al. (1985, p. 1) this was when “(t)he Kingdom of Swaziland came into being.” 
During this period King MswatiII, after whom the Swazis were named, possessed the 
necessary military strength to unite and expand his kingdom to the North and South 
(Bradley et al., 2010, p. 620). In his quest for expansion Mswati II came into contact 
with British missionaries and Boer voortrekkers in the 1840s. Unlike other kingdoms 
and tribes, Mswati II treated the Boers and the British as allies against rival tribes, most 
notably the powerful Zulu kingdom (Bradley et al., 2010, p. 623). In 1881, after the first 
Anglo-Boer War, the Boer and British governments acknowledged Swaziland’s 
independence and the kingdom was formally declared a British protectorate in order to 
avoid Swaziland’s incorporation into either the Transvaal Boer republic or the 
Portuguese colony of Mozambique, which had both laid territorial claims to Swaziland 
(Davies et al., 1985, pp. 1-2).    
4.1.2. The Colonial Period  
During this period the Swazi King Mbadzeni was persuaded to cede large parts of the 
kingdom to Boer farmers seeking winter grazing lands (Davies et al., 1985, p. 2). The 
years following Mbadzeni’s death (1889) and those of his successor, King Bhunu 
(1895-1899), were under the rule of the Queen-regent Labotsibeni, or Indlovukazi – 
queen regent at the time (Booth, 2000, p. 6). In order to clarify the confusion over 
grazing lands’ rights issued during the Mbadzeni era, the British colonial authority 
intervened. This resulted in the concession of two-thirds of the kingdom to foreign 
concessionaries during the period between 1904 and 1908 (Booth, 2000, p. 6). The 
                                                          
13
 The Bantu people who migrated to South Africa are known as the Nguni, and they are divided into two 
groups: the Northern Nguni and the Southern Nguni. The Northern Nguni includes the Zulu (from 
Kwazula Natal, South Africa), the Swazi (From Swaziland, and Mpumalanga, South Africa), and the 
Shangaan (from Southern Mozambique). The Southern Nguni include the Xhosa, the largest group in the 
Southern Nguni family (Mwakikagile, 2008, p. 153).  
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remaining third would be reserved to the ‘Swazi Nation’, or what has become known as 
‘Swazi Nation Land (SNL)’ (Davies et al., 1985, p. 2).  
In 1910 Swaziland – and the other High Commissioner Territories, Basutoland 
(Lesotho), and Bechuanaland (Botswana) – joined the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU)
14
, and the Schedule to the Union of South Africa Act envisaged their eventual 
incorporation into South Africa (EISA, 2008a). The desire to incorporate the High 
Commissioner Territories was both economic (as the SACU allowed for the Territories 
to be administered as an integral part of South Africa with no tariff constraints on the 
flow of goods between the countries) and political (as the SACU encouraged the 
overwhelming economic dependence of the Territories on South Africa) (McCarthy, 
2003, p. 14).  
In 1921, King Sobhuza II acceded to the throne and inherited many challenges. One in 
particular was the incorporation of Swaziland into South Africa (Booth, 2000, p. 8). The 
radical changes made by the South African government with the implementation of a 
new apartheid system, which was based on racial discrimination and white persons’ 
political domination, relinquished the possibilities of incorporation (Beck, 2000, p. 
125). South Africa’s intense discriminatory policies coupled with its independence from 
the Commonwealth and its change to a republic, resulted in the removal of the 1910 
Schedule to the Union of South Africa Act which stated that the territories would be 
incorporated into South Africa (Zwane, 1964, p. 4). 
It was during the 1960s that Swaziland’s efforts towards colonial independence began 
to accelerate. Unlike the other Territories, Swaziland had no legislative body. This issue 
was resolved during the drafting of the Constitution. The process leading up to the 
implementation of the Constitution was characterised by disagreements between several 
interest groups, which led to a two factions’ polarization. On one hand, the 
conservative-traditionalist element represented by King Sobhuza II, together with the 
Swazi National Council (SNC), or Sibaya, backed by the European Advisory Council. 
On the other hand, the nationalist-progressive element, the Ngwane (Swazi) National 
Liberatory Congress (NNLC) (Zwane, 1964, p. 4). In 1964 Swaziland’s first 
                                                          
14
The original 1910 SACU agreement was between the Government of the Union of South Africa, the 
High Commissioner Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate (SACU, 
1910). Currently SACU consists of Botswana (previously Bechuanaland), Lesotho (previously 
Basutoland), Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa (SACU, 2013). 
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Constitution entered into force, and during the same year Sobhuza II established a 
political party, the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) (Vieceli, 1982, p. 58). By the 
time of pre-independence parliamentary elections in 1967, the INM had consolidated 
their political support among the population, and achieved undisputed control over the 
post-colonial state (Vieceli, 1982, p. 58). 
4.1.3. Independence  
On September 6
th.
, 1968, Swaziland achieved independence and inherited a 
Westminster-style Constitution providing for a multi-party electoral system. Issues 
surrounding political parties began to surface in the 1972 parliamentary elections. The 
INM managed to maintain domination by winning 21 out of the 24 National Assembly 
seats, while the NNLC obtained the remaining three seats (Vieceli,1982, p. 58). This 
triggered a judicial crisis as the INM challenged the citizenship of one of the NNLC 
elected Member of Parliament, a South African named Thomas Ngwenya (Kabemba et 
al., 2004, p. 5). The loss of the three seats did not represent a serious threat to the INM, 
nor did the nationality of the South African MP. What made this significant was that 
constituencies containing large numbers of sugar plantation workers elected the three 
candidates. This indicated, according to Vieceli (1982, p. 58), that “(...) the NNLC was 
still capable of capturing the support of industrial workers and those who were not 
dependent upon the Swazi rulers for land.” 
The government took immediate action and ordered the deportation of Thomas 
Ngwenya. When Ngwenya’s challenge to the deportation order held up in court, 
Sobhuza II and the SNC submitted the Immigration Amendment Act to the parliament. 
The Act was passed and once again Ngwenya was deported. Ngwenya challenged the 
government by taking the matter to the Appeal Court, where the Amendment Act was 
deemed unconstitutional (Vieceli 1982, p. 59). As a final political solution, in April 
1973 Sobhuza II declared a state of emergency as he suspended the 1968 Constitution 
and issued a royal decree declaring political parties illegal (including the INM). Right 
after he took control of all legislative, judicial, and executive powers (Kabemba et al., 
2004, p. 6).  
Economically, Swaziland continued to depend on South Africa, since the sole medium 
of exchange and legal tender was the rand. In accordance with the SACU agreement all 
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external transactions were made through South African banks and subject to South 
African exchange controls (McCarthy, 2003, p. 7). On the 5
th.
December 1974 the 
currency union was formally established, with the signing of the Rand Monetary 
Agreement (RMA)
15
.  
4.1.4. Rule under King Mswati III 
The events that followed 1973 shaped the future of Swaziland’s political system, as it 
was during this period that the Tinkhundla system of governance was first put in place. 
The 1980s was a decade of change as it brought about formal opposition to the system, 
exacerbated by the death of Sobhuza in 1982. In 1986 Prince Makhosetive was crowned 
as King Mswati III (Vieceli, 1982, p. 59). Faced with immense international and 
domestic pressure for political reform, in 1996 Mswati III appointed a Constitutional 
Review Commission (CRC) which was tasked of drafting the proposal for a new 
Constitution. After five years the CRC was dismantled and the King appointed a new 
commission tasked with the duty of creating a new Constitution (Kabemba et al., 2004, 
p. 7).On July the 26
th
. 2005, Mswati III signed the draft of the new Constitution marking 
the end of a ten year drafting and consultation process. The Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland came into force on the 8
th.
  February 2006 (GoS and European 
Commission, 2006, p. 60). The new Constitution did not bring about any significant 
political changes. The ban on political parties has not been lifted and the separation of 
powers between the executive, made up of the King as Head of State, the legislative and 
judiciary is blurred (AFDB, 2011, p. 1). 
4.2. Economic Overview  
Swaziland is classified as a lower middle-income country with a GNI of USD 3.470 per 
capita in 2011 (World Bank, 2013a). Although Swaziland is categorised as a lower 
middle-income country poverty is widespread, with a population of approximately 
1,068 million in 2011, 63 per cent of whom lived under the 1,25 dollar-a-day income 
poverty line (World Bank, 2013a). A landlocked country largely surrounded by South 
Africa, Swaziland’s economy is integrated with the world economy through two main 
channels: directly, with sugar exports to the European Union (EU), and indirectly, 
                                                          
15
 The RMA agreement was revised in April 1986 to establish the Common Monetary Area (CMA), 
between Swaziland, Lesotho, and South Africa. Namibia joined the CMA in 1992 (McCarthy, 2003, p. 8). 
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through its close economic and financial integration with South Africa (Basdevant et al., 
2013, p. 5). This heavy dependence on its neighbour has translated into South Africa 
accounting for more than 80 per cent of Swaziland’s imports and an estimated 64 per 
cent of exports (World Bank, 2013b). 
The Swazi economy benefits from preferential access to the EU under the Cotonou, the 
U.S under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (IMF, 2006, p. 6). 
Swaziland is also a member of the WTO and a number of regional economic 
organizations, such as the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
SACU, the CMA, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Due to 
its large agricultural and agro-industry base, wood pulp, sugar, soft drink concentrate, 
and canned fruit remain the country’s main exports, and the main imports are motor 
vehicles, machinery, transport equipment, petroleum products, and chemical products 
16
(GoS and European Commission, 2007, p. 4.) Although the manufacturing industry is 
the anchor of economic growth in Swaziland (SACU, 2012, p. 48), 70 per cent of the 
population depends on the agricultural sector for subsistence (AfDB, 2011, p. 7). 
                                                          
16
See Appendix 7 for Swaziland’s exports and imports by region and Swaziland’s top ten sources of 
imports and destinations of exports. 
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Box  4.1 Contributions of the Sugar Sector to Swaziland’s Economy 
Swaziland’s sugar industry has become a critical aspect to Swaziland’s development over the 
years. Sugar cane has become the most prevalent crop in irrigated agriculture – the only 
other crops that occupy irrigated land in Swaziland are citrus, bananas, and vegetable – of 
which it accounts for more than 90 per cent of Swaziland’s allocated water (GoS, 2007, p. 
6). According to the Swaziland Sugar Association (2013), in 2005 the sugar industry 
accounted for:  
- 59 per cent of agricultural output; 
- 18 per cent of GDP; 
- 24 per cent of manufacturing output; 
- 35 per cent of agricultural employment; 
- 18 per cent of manufacturing employment; 
- 16 per cent of private sector employment; 
- 10 per cent of formal sector employment; 
- 7 per cent of total export earnings  
- 58 per cent of total Swazi exports to the EU.   
As a signatory to the ACP-EU Partnership (Cotonou) Agreement, Swaziland has benefited 
tremendously under the ACP preferential agreements: the Sugar Protocol and the Special 
Preference Sugars (IMF, 2006, p. 6). Although sugar exported to SACU countries accounts 
for more than half of Swaziland’s sugar exports, under the preferential agreements 
Swaziland was able to export sugar to the EU at prices that were three times higher than 
those in unprotected sugar markets. Even though exports to the EU only accounted for a 
quarter of the total sugar exports in volume terms, it generated 40 per cent in value (IMF, 
2006, p. 6). Earnings of sales from the EU became a major source of industry revenue during 
the years prior to the reforms. Consequently, the 2006 EU sugar reforms marked the 
beginning of a gradual reduction in the sugar price paid by Europe, which adversely affected 
Swaziland’s sugar industry and overall economy (GoS and European Commission, 2007, p. 
4). To facilitate the process of transition in the sugar sector, the EC has assisted Swaziland 
with an aid package funded by the European Commission’s general budget called 
“Accompanying Measure for Sugar Protocol Countries” (AMSPC). Programmes under 
AMSPC have been signed for the years (2006, 2007, and 2008) (EEAS, 2012).  
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Swaziland has remained one of the slowest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa, 
as illustrated in figure. 4.1., with an average annual gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, from 2003 to 2011, of 2,4 per cent
17
.According to the European Commission 
(2006, p. 9), the main reasons for Swaziland’s weakening growth performance are “(...) 
low investments, deteriorating terms of trade and competitiveness, coupled with poor 
governance ratings.” Growth is further hampered by institutional factors such as “(p)oor 
labour productivity, with high cost of doing business, and low governance and 
transparency indicators deter new investment.” (European Commission, 2009, p. 9) 
Although Swaziland is considered a lower middle-income country as ranked according 
to its GNI of US$ 3.470 per capita in 2011 (World Bank, 2013a), it is merely a 
reflection of the highly skewed income distribution within the country as 63 per cent of 
the Swazi population are living under the poverty line and unemployment levels 
continue to rise with over 50 per cent in the 15-24 age group (AfDB, 2012, p. 2).  
Fig. 4.1. Annual GDP Growth: Swaziland, SSA, and lower-middle income countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2013c). 
As a member of the CMA, Swaziland’s currency – lilangeni (singular), or Emalangeni 
(plural), which is marked by the symbol “E” – is pegged at par to the South African 
                                                          
17
I calculated the average annual GDP growth by adding the annual GDP growth of the following years: 
2003 (2,2%), 2004 (2,9%), 2005 (2,5%), 2006 (3,3%), 2007 (3,5%), 2008 (2,4%), 2009 (1,3%), 2010 
(1,9%) and 2011 (1,3%) and dividing the total by nine (the number of years in this time-sequence). 
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rand. Nonetheless, Swaziland has the liberty, as stated in the CMA agreement, to delink 
the lilangeni from the rand (Kumaloand et al., 2011, p. 5). Any modification in the 
exchange-rate of the rand will spill over into an equivalent change in the lilangeni, 
forcing Swaziland to pursue an economic policy that is, to a large extent, influenced by 
South African interests. As a small, highly open and landlocked economy, Swaziland’s 
high dependence on a limited number of exports and undiversified markets leaves the 
country vulnerable to external shocks. Swaziland’s membership to the CMA and SACU 
has provided relative stability, and the pegging of the lilangeni to the rand has been an 
important cushion to the country’s financial sector (AfDB, 2011, p. 19).  
With an average growth rate over 2 per cent over the past decade, Swaziland’s 
economic performance has been almost half of that of its SACU partners (AfDB, 2011, 
iii). Swaziland is also highly dependent on SACU revenues, which account for over half 
of the total of government’s revenue18 (McCarthy, 2003, p. 17). This high dependence 
leaves Swaziland exposed to external shocks (Basdevant et al., 2013, p. 9). As 
Basdevant et al. (2013, p. 10) explain, 
 (...) SACU transfers are not explicitly modelled (...). Small shocks on South African GDP have very 
significant impact on SACU transfers received by smaller members of the union, such as Swaziland. 
South Africa generates about 90 percent of the revenue of the SACU pool, and the existing rules make 
BLNS receipts heavily dependent on South Africa GDP projections. 
Consequently, following the global economic slowdown, Swaziland experienced a 
fiscal crisis due to a decline in SACU revenues, which were lower than expected. This 
resulted in the economic slowdown from 1,9 per cent in 2010, and 1,3 per cent in 2011, 
which is significantly below the long-term average growth rate (2012, SACU, p. 48). 
The impact of the global crisis led to a 62 per cent decline in SACU receipts, which 
ultimately worsened Swaziland’s fiscal position in 2010/2011 (SACU, 2010, p. 56). The 
large fiscal deficits accumulated during the fiscal years of 2010/11 accounted for an 
estimated 13 per cent of GDP (Basdevant et al., 2013, p. 29). See table 4.1 for an 
illustration of Swaziland’s fiscal deficit for the 2009/2010-2010/2011 period19.  
 
                                                          
18
For more information on SACU and the new Revenue Distribution Formula, see McCarthy (2003) and 
Wang et al. (2007). 
19
 Table 4.1 is merely a summary made by the author. For a better illustration please refer to appendix 5  
which contains two tables: Swaziland’s Selected Economic Indicators, 2009-16; and Swaziland’s Fiscal 
Operations of the Central Government, 2009/10-16/17. 
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Table 4.1: Swaziland’s Fiscal Deficit 2009/2010-2010/2011 
(E Millions
20
) 
 2009/2010 % of GDP 2010/2011 % of GDP 
GDP at Market Price  24 995 100 27 064 100 
Total Revenue and 
Grants  
9 222 35.7 7 053 24.5 
Expenditures and Net 
Lending   
11 038 43.3 10 596 38.3 
Overall Fiscal Balance 
(Excluding grants) 
-1 936 -7.6 -3 838 -13.9 
Public debt, Gross  12.6  20.6 
Source: Mongardini et al. (2011, pp. 17-18). 
Prior to the global economic crisis, in the financial year 2006/2007 SACU receipts 
contributed with 71 per cent of Swaziland’s total revenue (SACU, 2007, p. 37)21. In 
2007/2008 SACU revenues remained the dominant contributor to national revenue (63,1 
per cent of the total) (SACU, 2009, p. 41). Table 4.2 shows Swaziland’s dependence on 
SACU revenues by illustrating how much of Swaziland’s income comes from SACU. 
The decline in SACU revenues experienced in 2010/2011 and 2011/2012, coupled with 
a widened public wage bill (at an estimated 15 GDP per cent), gave rise to the fiscal 
crisis (Basdevant et al., 2013, p. 15). In 2010/2011, Swaziland’s total public revenue, 
including grants, was E7,26 billion whilst total public expenditures amounted to E9,5 
billion resulting in a deficit of 2,24 billion (SACU, 2012, p. 47).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
Throughout this dissertation the financial figures may be displayed as US$, Euro or Emalangeni. 
Appendix 8 illustrates the average annual exchange rate for the years 2009-2012. Appendix 9 gives a 
more detailed illustration of selected economic indicators and fiscal operations of the Central Government 
2009-17. 
21
 SACU revenue received in a given yearis based on GDP projections for that year. An adjustment is 
made in that year by adding two more years, to correct for discrepancies between the transfers received 
(i.e., based on the projections) and the level corresponding to the actual collection (i.e., based on actual 
numbers).This two-year lag has proven, in the context of the 2008 crisis, very damaging (Basdevant et al., 
2013, p. 10). The damaging effects of the global crisis are thus felt in 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 as 
illustrated by table 4.1. 
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Table 4.2: Swaziland Government Budgetary Operations 
(E Millions) 
 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013 
Total Revenue 9 400 6 968 7 313 12 216 
of which SACU 6 000 2 631 2 884 7064 
% Total Revenue 64 38 39 58 
Source: Adapted from SACU (2010, p. 55) and SACU (2012, p. 47). 
4.3. The Social Situation  
Swaziland’s classification as a middle-income country is somewhat contradictory, 
because unlike most middle income countries – and characteristically similar to most 
low-income countries of SSA – 70 per cent of the Swazi population is dependent on 
subsistence farming for their livelihoods (AFDB, 2011, p. 7), many of which are living 
under the poverty line  (World Bank 2013a). With a 2013 Human Development Index 
(HDI) of 0,536, which gives the country a rank of 141 out of 187 countries (UNDP, 
2013), poverty reduction is central to the GoS, and towards the achievement of the 
MDGs. This has been elaborated in the 2005 PRSAP (GoS and European Commission, 
2007, p. 13). The PRASP aims at improving governance, economic growth and human 
development with the overall objective of cutting the poverty rate by 50 per cent from 
its 1995 level by 2015 (GoS and European Commission, 2007, p. 13). In 2011, 63 per 
cent of the population lived under the national poverty line, down from the 69 per cent 
in 2005, as indicated in table 4.3
22
. Despite the positive outcomes in poverty reduction, 
the current fiscal crisis threatens to reverse these gains (AfDB, 2011, p. 8), and income 
inequalities remain at all time highs with a 2010 Gini index
23
 estimate of 51,5 (World 
Bank, 2013c).   
 
                                                          
22
 The indicators represented in table 4.3 have been specifically selected by the author for the purpose of 
this dissertation. For the complete list of Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals 
the information is available at: 
<http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Attach/Indicators/HandbookEnglish.pdf> (accessed on 
23/06/2013). 
23
 The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from perfectly equal distribution. A Gini 
index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality (World Bank, 
2013c). 
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Table 4.3: Indicators for Monitoring the MDG’s: Swaziland  
MDGs Indicators  1995 2000 2005 2010 Target 
Population below national poverty 
line, total, (%)  
66 69 69 n.a 35 
Population undernourished (%) 23 18 19 30 - 
Net enrolment in primary education 
(%)  
n.a 78 76 86 100 
Ratio of girls to boys in primary 
education 
n.a 1:08 1:01 1:01 1:01 
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary 
education 
n.a 1.08 1:01 1:01 1:01 
Primary completion rate (%)  63 
 
61 65 76 - 
Literacy rate, age 15-24, (%) n.a 
 
92 n.a 93 - 
Mortality rate, infant per 1 000 live 
birth) 
65 77 82 71 - 
Under-five mortality rate, per 1 000 
live births  
90 114 128 109 30 
Prevalence of HIV, total % of 
population ages 15-49 
11 21 25 26 - 
Sources: Adapted from EC (2006, p.14), United Nations Statistics Division (2012) and  
(World Bank, 2013c). 
The population, estimated at 1,068 million in 2011, has remained almost unchanged in 
the last five years (AfDB, 2011, p. 7) despite a high annual birth rate of 29 births per 
1000 people (World Bank, 2013c). This may be attributed to high mortality rates which 
include, but are not limited to, an infant mortality rate of 69 per 1.000 live births in 
2011, 104 deaths per 1.000 for children under the age of 5 years (World Bank, 2013c), 
and an estimated 7.000 AIDS related deaths per year (AfDB, 2011, p. 7). High levels of 
poverty, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and poor quality of education and training had 
adverse effects on the education system (AfDB, 2011, p 8). 
Efforts to reduce poverty have been concentrated in food security, improving access to 
primary education and extending the reach of anti-HIV/AIDS programmes (European 
Commission, 2007, p. 10). According to the United Nations Statistics Division (2012), 
food insecurity has increased over the years: in 1995, 23 per cent of the Swazi 
population was undernourished; these figures increased considerably by 2010 with an 
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estimated 30 per cent of the population suffering from undernourishment (UNSTATS, 
2013). As Swaziland continues to experience increased food prices, high inflation, a 
soaring unemployment rate of 44 per cent in 2011 (World Bank, 2013c), and high fuel 
prices, food insecurity will remain a problem (WFP, 2012). According to the World 
Food Programme (WFP) 2012 vulnerability assessment, 115.713 people were facing 
food deficits, compared to 88.511 people in 2011 (WFP, 2012). 
Arguably the greatest socio-economic challenge facing Swaziland is the high burden of 
disease due to HIV/AIDS. Swaziland holds the highest number of people living with 
HIV/AIDS in the world, with a 2011 estimate of 26 per cent for ages 15-49, and a life 
expectancy of 49 years (World Bank, 2013c). In fact, the Southern Africa sub-region, in 
particular, experiences the most severe HIV epidemics in the world as it accounts for 
one third (34 per cent) of all the people living with HIV globally (UNICEF, 2009). 
Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana stand among the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates in 
the region (UNICEF, 2009). HIV/AIDS is having a devastating social and economic 
impact on many households as incomes are lost and the number of orphans and 
vulnerable children continues to rise rapidly (EU, 2007, p. 11).  
Fig. 4.2.: Prevalence of HIV total, % of population ages 15-49: Swaziland, Lesotho, 
and Botswana 
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Source: World Bank (2013c). 
Swaziland’s primary school completion rate stood at 77 per cent in 2011, and a 
secondary school enrolment percentage of 60 per cent during the same year (World 
Bank, 2013c). The major challenges faced by this sector are inadequate national 
resources for education, rising poverty levels, unemployment and high HIV/AIDS 
infection rates (GoS, 2009, p. 155).      
4.4. The Political Landscape 
One of the major political developments in Swaziland has been the adoption of the new 
Constitution which came into force in 2006 (GoS and European Commission, 2007, p. 
6). The Constitution attempts to resolve the perplexity associated with a bi-cameral 
Westminster system with a customary system (AfDB, 2011, p. 2). Before the adoption 
of the 2005 Constitution, King Sobhuza II held executive, legislative and judicial 
powers issued to him by right of the 1973 Royal Proclamation, under which the 
Constitution was suspended and political parties banned. The supremacy of the 1973 
Proclamation was reaffirmed in a decree issued by King Mswati III in 1992 (GoS and 
European Commission, 2002, p. 4). However, the new Constitution is said to bring an 
end the possibility of rule by decree (Gos and European Commission, 2006, p. 6).   
The present system of government is characterised by a combination of customary law 
and Roman-Dutch law. The dual system of governance is further legitimised through 
the electoral system used, the tinkhundla (Kabemba et al., 2004, p. 1). The government 
is made up of a Cabinet of Ministers responsible to a two-chamber parliament. The 
King is the Head of State and is advised by the Prime Minister and the Swazi National 
Council, which is composed of twenty-four members appointed by the King, and other 
local government sub-systems, including traditional structures (Gos and European 
Commission, 2007, p. 3).  
Over the decades many of SSA countries have emerged out of authoritarian regimes and 
embraced electoral democracy. As it stands, Swaziland is Africa’s last executive 
monarchy, and unlike its neighbours Swaziland is the only country in the SADC that is 
not committed to multi-party elections (Kabemba et al., 2004, p. 3). Despite the new 
Constitution, political parties are still not allowed to participate in elections, as per the 
1973 decree. The suppression of political oppositions was further legitimised in May 
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2008, when the Swazi Parliament passed the Suppression of Terrorism Act
24
, which 
came into force in November 2008 (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 5).  
Although the new Constitution allows for freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly and association, no where does it make provision for political parties 
(Constitution of Swaziland, 2005). The tinkhudla system of governance is considered, 
by law, a democratic system. According to Kabemba et al. (2004, p. 12), “(t)he political 
impasse in Swaziland raises questions regarding the nature of democracy and whether 
or not a state could be regarded as democratic without political parties.” Swaziland’s 
tinkhundla system of governance allows for the election of parliamentary 
representatives from specific constituencies through a three-stage election system 
creating a bicameral election system composed of the House of Assembly and the 
House of Senate (Kabemba et al., 2004, p. 7). The exclusion of political parties is the 
basis of the tinkhundla system as parliamentarians are elected instead. Fifty-five 
members of the House of Assembly are elected by fifty-five constituencies or 
tinkhundla (inkhundla for singular), into which the country is divided for electoral and 
other administrative purposes. The King then appoints an additional ten members of the 
House of Assembly (EU, 2007, p. 3). The Senate is comprised of thirty members, ten 
being appointed by the King and twenty selected by the House of Assembly (Kabemba 
et al., 2004, p. 8).  
The government of Swaziland stands by the tinkhundla system as being a democratic 
system of representative governance from a grassroots level. However, it is through this 
tinkhundla system that the monarch has absolute power over the executive and 
legislative arms of government, as it is the King who appoints the prime minister, who 
then appoints the cabinet, which is subject to the King’s approval (Kabemba et al., 
2004, p. 8). Trade unions and civil society groups have been highly critical in 
expressing their discontent about the suppression of political pluralism in Swaziland 
(AfDB, 2011, p. 2).  
                                                          
24
 The Suppression of Terrorism Act was rapidly implemented. The bill was tabled in the parliament with 
a certificate of urgency, and as a result it did not follow the routine procedure of publication in the 
government gazette for 30 days to allow for public commentary (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 5). This 
hurried process is said to be in connection with the attempt to blow up a bridge leading to the royal 
residence. This incident further intensified the tension between the government and political parties. The 
Suppression of Terrorism Act was used to declare a number of groups ‘terrorist organisations’, in 
particular political parties (EISA, 2008b). 
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There has been particular dissatisfaction with the lack of checks and balances in the 
governance system in which the corrupt elite run rampant. There have been continuous 
calls for reform at making the government more accountable and efficient in the use of 
resources. This is translated in the governments 1999-2022 National Development 
Strategy (NDS) and the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) (AfDB, 2011, p. 2). 
According to Kabemba et al. (2004, p. 17), “(t)he quality of a political system is judged 
on its ability to contribute to good governance, security, prosperity and other social 
good.” 
In Swaziland, views on governance are divided between the traditionalists and the 
reformists. The traditionalists are strong advocates of the status quo. They state, that in 
contrast with other countries in the region, Swaziland has been more successful as it is a 
middle-income country where per capita income and economic growth rates have 
historically outperformed others (Kabemba et al., 2004, p. 17). Reformists, both 
domestic and international, are against the current political status quo. According to the 
AfDB (2005, p. 3), “Swaziland faces a serious of governance challenges, especially in 
areas of institutional reforms and capacity of the state to respond to social challenges, 
democracy and rule of law.” 
Current development thinking has placed immense importance on the improvement of 
systems of governance as one of the essential ingredients for sustainable, long-term 
growth. These include, according to Kabbaj (2003, p. 54), 
(e)stablishing systems of good governance, namely greater accountability, transparency, and greater 
participation in government and corporate affairs, promoting legal and judicial reforms, and combating 
corruption. It also includes civil service reforms, reduction in unproductive government spending – such 
as military expenditure – and redirecting government investment towards primary health and education, 
as these form the bedrock for growth. 
According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Swaziland was ranked among the 
lowest countries for indicators such as ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘government 
effectiveness’. While indicators such as ‘control of corruption’ and ‘rule of law’ were 
Swaziland’s highest, receiving a 2011 ranking of 50,2 for the former and 42,3 out of 
100 for the latter. These indicators and others are illustrated in table 4.4, below.  
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Table 4.4: Ranking of Swaziland According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
Governance Indicator
25
 
 
Sources 
 
Year 
 
Percentile 
Rank        
(0-100) 
 
Governance 
Score            
(-2.5 to 
+2.5) 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Voice and Accountability 
 
 
9 2011 12.7 -1.25 0.13 
8 2006 15.5 -1.8 0.14 
5 2002 11.5 -1.32 0.23 
Political Stability/Absence of 
Violence 
5 2011 30.7 -0.47 0.27 
3 2006 35.1 -0.30 0.32 
2 2002 44.7 +0.01 0.45 
Government Effectiveness 
 
 
6 2011 28.4 -0.69 0.21 
5 2006 21.5 -0.84 0.23 
3 2002 32.2 -0.58 0.27 
Regulatory  Quality 
 
 
7 2011 28.4 -0.64 0.19 
6 2006 30.4 -0.57 0.21 
4 2002 44.6 -0.21 0.28 
Rule of Law 
 
 
10 2011 42.3 -4.42 0.14 
8 2006 28.7 -0.68 0.18 
5 2002 30.6 -0.67 0.24 
Control of Corruption 
 
 
7 2011 50.2 -0.27 0.21 
6 2006 47.8 -0.29 0.23 
3 2002 45.9 -0.32 0.34 
Source: Kaufmann and Mastruzzi (2010).  
 
 
                                                          
25
Voice and accountability captures the perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
freedom of media. Political Stabilitymeasures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence 
and terrorism. Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitments to such policies. 
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of Law captures 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. Control of corruption captures the perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
the capture of the state by elites and private interests. (Kaufmann et al., 2010), available at 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm> (accessed 27/06/2013). 
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Conclusion  
Swaziland’s economic growth rate remains one of the lowest in SSA, with an average 
growth rate of 2 per cent. This sluggish growth rate, coupled with high poverty levels, 
and the highest HIV infection rate in the world, have threatened the country’s 
development benefits, and have become Swaziland’s greatest social-economic obstacle 
during the 21
st.
 century. From the onset of Swaziland’s status as a British protectorate in 
1881, Swaziland’s economy has been intrinsically linked to, and dependent on, South 
Africa. This dependency status is ever more present in recent years as Swaziland 
continues to depend on SACU revenues (over 50 percent of Swaziland’s total revenue). 
Under the CMA the lilangeni is pegged at par to the rand, which further entrenches 
economic dependency on South Africa and limits Swaziland’s ability to influence 
macroeconomic policy. Swaziland’s political landscape has been characterised by 
tension since the independence in 1968, and in particular the issuing of the 1973 decree 
which banned political parties and vested all executive, judicial, and legislative 
authority to the King. The 2005 Constitution sought to address these political tensions 
by putting an end to rule by decree, and providing a new political framework. Although 
some progress has been made in some areas, political parties remain banned and the 
Constitution has been criticised for maintaining the status quo. 
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V. Towards a Greater Ownership of Development Policies and 
Strategies: the case of Swaziland  
Introduction 
This chapter aims at assessing the processes and commitments made by the GoS in 
taking leadership over its development agenda, in particular the primary goal of poverty 
reduction. Section 5.1 briefly introduces the strategies taken by the GoS to reduce 
poverty and discusses the multi-dimensional nature of poverty in Swaziland. In 
accordance with the principles of ownership set out in the Paris Declaration, section 5.2 
aims at assessing Swaziland’s ownership over development priorities and strategies. 
The last section (5.3) primarily focus on the efforts made by the GoS and its 
development partners in achieving the goals of poverty reduction and the progress made 
in implementing the principles set out in the Paris Declaration. 
5.1. Attacking Poverty in Swaziland 
According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking 
Poverty, the nature and evolution of poverty has come to encompass “(...) not only 
education and health as a concern in their own right, but they merit special attention 
when they accompany material deprivation.” (World Bank, 2001, p. 15) As stated in the 
Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda, a country’s ownership over development 
strategies and policies – in the form of PRSPs – is the key ingredient for aid 
effectiveness. Swaziland’s development agenda has been guided by the NDS for the 
period 1997-2022, which provides a long-term development framework within which 
short and medium-term development plans will be formulated (GoS, 1999a, p. 1). The 
NDS is the country’s overall vision for developments which, according to the GoS 
(1999a, p. 1),“(...) by the year 2022, the Kingdom of Swaziland will be in the top 10% 
of the medium human development countries founded on sustainable economic 
development, social justice and political stability.” 
Consequently, the 2005 PRSAP was developed in order to operationalise the poverty 
reduction vision of the NDS (GoS, 2005b, p. 13). More recently Swaziland’s policy 
architecture has expanded to address emerging development challenges, particularly 
those of an economic nature. This new architecture includes the 2010 Fiscal Adjustment 
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Roadmap (FAR), and the 2011 Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS). According to the 
GoS (2013, p. 15) the FAR and the ERS were developed for the following purposes:  
(t)he FAR was developed in order to respond to a reduced resource envelope, following an 
unprecedented decline in SACU revenue. The FAR focuses on domestic revenue enhancement, 
expenditure rationalisation and debt management (...). The ERS was prepared by the Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development to support the removal of long standing impediments to economic 
activity which have contributed to sluggish economic growth over the past decade.   
Considering international and national efforts towards poverty reduction, it is important 
to understand the nature of poverty in Swaziland in order to examine poverty reduction 
policies and strategies of the GoS. It is important to note that there is no single concept 
of poverty or an international consensus on the guidelines for measuring poverty. 
Poverty is a construction of specific societies. Furthermore, different groups within a 
society may construct it in different ways, resulting in a highly contested definition of 
poverty. According to Lister (2004, p. 3) poverty 
(...) is highly contested. Concepts of poverty have practical effects. They carry implicit explanations 
which, in turn, underpin policy prescriptions. The emphasis placed upon socio-economic structural 
conditions, power relationships, culture and individual behaviour varies. The policies developed to tackle 
poverty reflect dominant conceptualizations. 
Swaziland’s PRASP measures poverty in terms of income poverty (GoS, 2005b, p. 19). 
This is concerned, on the one hand, with a person’s material resources, especially 
income, and, on the other hand, with actual outcomes in terms of living standards and 
activities (Lister, 2004, p. 14). The Swaziland Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (SHIES) – conducted in 1995, 2001, and 2009 – makes a distinction between 
poor and non-poor based on two poverty lines. The lower poverty line measures the 
income required to purchase food that yields 2200 calories per capita per day (GoS, 
2005b, p. 19). The upper poverty line measures the necessary income to buy food 
requirements in addition to an allowance for essential non-food expenditures such as 
basic clothing, heating and lighting (GoS, 2005b, p. 19). The lower or extreme poverty 
line was established at E215.00 per capita per month in 2010, and accounts for an 
estimated 29 per cent of people living in poverty. The upper poverty line was 
established at E461.00 per capita per month in 2010, and accounts for 69 per cent of the 
population (GoS, 2011a, pp. 7-11).  
Poverty in Swaziland is influenced by a strong rural dimension, although it should not 
be overlooked in urban areas too. According to the 2009/2010 SHIES report, urban 
poverty accounted for 31 per cent while rural poverty accounted for a staggering 71 per 
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cent of poverty in Swaziland (GoS, 2011a, p. 10). Not only does rural Swaziland holds 
the majority of people living in poverty, but it is also where an estimated 75 per cent of 
the population lives in (GoS, 2011a, p. 11), of which a large portion depends on 
subsistence economy/or disguised unemployment for income (GoS, 2005b, p. 22). 
Faced with dwindling employment opportunities, and a 40 per cent unemployment rate, 
many poor Swazis generate their income from self-employment usually through the 
informal sector (GoS, 2005b, p. 20). The informal sector provides a source of income 
for street vendors who sell fruits and used clothes (most of which are women), hair 
cutters working under trees in city parks, and boys washing cars at stream beds, just to 
name a few (IRIN, 2002). Among those employed by the formal sector, a substantial 
number are seasonally employed and 62 per cent of the seasonally employed continue to 
live under the poverty line (Gos, 2005b, p. 20).  
Swaziland’s classification as a lower-middle income country with a GNI of US$ 3.470 
per capita (World Bank, 2013a) distorts the reality of the highly skewed income 
distribution within the country, which severely counteracts economic expansion and 
further perpetuates poverty (GoS, 2005b, p. 21). In 2010 the income share held by the 
highest 10 per cent of the population was at 41,1 per cent of the total, and the income 
share held by the highest 20 per cent sat at a staggering 56 per cent (World Bank, 
2013c). Consequently, in 2010 the income share held by the lowest 10 per cent of the 
population sat at a meagre 1,7 per cent, and the income share held by the lowest 20 per 
cent during the same year was 4,1 per cent (World Bank, 2013c). According to the GoS 
(2005b, p. 21) “(....) differences in income distribution are historically structural and a 
result of non-corrective laissez-faire policies that bypass the poor.” Although it is 
widely known that one of the central necessities for the success of poverty reduction is 
national economic development, according to the World Bank (2001, p. 37)  
(...) poverty is an outcome of more than economic processes. It is an outcome of economic, social and 
political processes that interact with and reinforce each other in ways that can worsen or ease the 
deprivation poor people face every day. 
The social dimensions of poverty in Swaziland are characterised by their relation to 
education and health standards, access to safe water and sanitation, and family size 
(GoS, 2005b, p. 21). There is also a strong correlation between gender and poverty. 
According to the 2011 SHIES report, in 2009/2010 67 per cent of female headed 
household were living in poverty in comparison to 59 per cent in male headed 
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households (GoS, 2011a, p. 14). The World Development Report 2000/2001 (World 
Bank, 2001, p. 10) states that “(g)reater gender equity is desirable in its own right and 
for its instrumental social and economic benefits for poverty reduction.” The promotion 
of gender equality has been stated as one of Swaziland’s development strategies and 
priorities in both the NDS (GoS, 1999, p. 26) and the PRASP (GoS, 2005b, p. 22).  
The 2001 SHIES report also makes reference to the strong relationship between 
education and poverty in Swaziland. The prevalence of poverty among illiterate people 
is at 71 per cent in comparison to 30 per cent among households headed by people with 
a primary school education (GoS 2005b, p. 22). Issues of health, in particular the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, are at the forefront of Swaziland’s development priorities and 
strategies. In 2011 Swaziland’s total life expectancy stood at 49 years, and the 
HIV/AIDS prevalence between 15 and 49 years stood at 26 per cent (World Bank, 
2013c). This leaves the country highly vulnerable, as the age groups most affected by 
HIV/AIDS are those in the working age population. Together with the decline in 
economic growth, the impact of HIV/AIDS on the economy of Swaziland is set to 
reverse many of development achievements (GoS, 2005b, p. 24).      
Poverty in Swaziland can be attributed to economic and social processes, but what are 
the causes? Swaziland’s PRASP links the high prevalence of poverty to a variety of 
structural factors. In consultation with those most affected by poverty the PRASP 
touches on the following causes of poverty (GoS, 2005b, p. 24): 
(t)he Tinkhundla consultations were chronic drought accompanied by crop failure, death of domestic 
animals, and lack of drinking water; lack of adequate agricultural land; isolation from mainstream 
markets and information sources; limited options for diversification of opportunities for income 
generation; and lack of competitive skills acquired through education. For women, tradition accords 
them minority status that denies them access to assets and productive resources. These factors trap the 
poor into poverty and militate against recovery.  
5.2 Assessing Swaziland’s Ownership over Development Priorities and 
Strategies  
“[p]artner countries commit to: exercise leadership in developing and implementing their 
national development strategies through broad consultative process.” (OECD, 2005a, p. 3) 
Within the NDS there are seven key macro strategic areas which will assist in achieving 
the overall approach to poverty reduction: sound economic management; economic 
empowerment; human resource development; agricultural development; 
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industrialisation; research for development; and environmental management (GoS, 
1997, pp. 2-3). The PRASP frames the development agenda under six interlinked key 
pillars that outline the strategic components for classifying certain policies, activities 
and projects into a sound framework for reducing poverty. The six pillars will be listed, 
and in accordance with the overall goal of the dissertation, each pillar will be briefly 
described by listing some of its strategies. According to the PRASP (GoS, 2005b, pp. 
26-32) the six pillars are:  
1. Macroeconomic stability: some of the strategies under this pillar are: (i) 
macroeconomic stability and good governance, (ii) maintaining fiscal discipline 
and prioritising public expenditure, (iii) redesigning a tax system conducive to 
investment and growth, (iv) investing in human capital to support economic 
growth, and (v) integrating participatory planning approaches to empower poor 
people. 
2. Empowering the poor to generate income and reduce inequalities: some of 
the strategies to be followed under this pillar are: (i) maintaining fiscal discipline 
and prioritising public expenditure, (ii) redesigning a tax system conducive to 
investment and growth; (iii) investing in human capital to support economic 
growth, and (iv) integrating participatory planning approaches to empower poor 
people. 
3. Rapid acceleration of economic growth based on broad participation: some 
of the measures to empower the poor to generate income and reduce inequality 
are: (i) promotion of irrigation on SNL to guarantee regular agricultural 
production, (ii) promotion of rural production, including support to high value 
crops through appropriate pricing and marketing improvements. 
4. Fair distribution of the benefits of growth through fiscal policy: some of the 
strategic measures are: (i) reorientation of public expenditure towards financing 
basic social services, such as basic education, primary health care, reducing 
HIV/AIDS infections, provision for safe water services etc, (ii) redesigning the 
current tax system to make it more progressive, and (iii) decentralising the 
budgeting process to increase grass-roots participation decision-making. 
5. Improving the quality of life of the poor: some of the strategies to achieve this 
goal are: (i) to introduce universal and compulsory primary education, (ii) 
shifting a largest share of public expenditure to basic education, (iii) halting the 
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spread of HIV/AIDS by scaling up measures for prevention, new infections and 
expanding Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) centres and the 
Availability of Anti Retro Viral (ARVs). 
6. Improve good governance and strengthen institutions: strengthening 
governance will include: (i) enhancing constitutional governance; (ii) 
decentralised governance; (iii) promoting participation of local communities in 
the planning and implementation process; and (iv) upholding the rule of law and 
the protection of human rights. 
Both the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda stress the importance of an open and 
inclusive dialogue on development policies. According to the OECD (2008, p. 17), 
ensuring ownership of the development processes will require developing country 
governments to “(...) work more closely with parliaments and local authorities in 
preparing, implementing and monitoring national development policies and plans. They 
will also engage with civil society organisations.” 
The participatory process involved during the compilation of the NDS began with the 
collection of views from the general public, which was accomplished through the 
appointment of an Economic Review Commission (ERC). In 1995, the ERC compiled a 
report that was the first phase of the NDS. Eight sector committees were then charged 
with the responsibility to give an in-depth analysis of specific areas (GoS, 1999a, p. 1). 
The formulation of the PRASP involved an intensive consultative process by the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Task Force MEPD. The Task Force consulted with a variety 
of stakeholders at a Tinkhundla level such as the poor, government officers, NGOs, 
chiefs, Members of Parliament, the donor community, private sector and other 
groupings (GoS, 2005b, p. 13).    
Promoting the participation of local communities in the planning and implementation 
process is an important aspect of the PRASP and NDS goals towards poverty reduction. 
Accordingly, the 2009 Tinkhundla and Regional Administration Bill makes provisions 
for a decentralised, community based approach towards the formulation of development 
policies and plans (GoS, 2009a, p. 7). The Bill outlines the powers of local authorities 
within each region. According to the Regional Administration Bill section 20 (3), (GoS, 
2009a, p. 13) one of the general duties of local authorities is to “(…) plan, initiate and 
execute polices, taking into account national policies and development plans.” 
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Accordingly, the Bill also makes provision for the establishment of Regional 
Development Communities (GoS (2009a, p. 31). According to Part IX section 68 of the 
Bill, “[t]here is established in each Region a Regional Development Committee, which 
shall give technical advice on development issues.” Regional Development Committees 
consist of the Regional Director (chairman), Regional Heads of public sector 
departments, all heads of Parastatals in the region, a representative of the Coordinating 
Assembly for Non-Governmental Organisations (CANGO), and a representative of 
community based organisations in the region (GoS, 2009a, p. 31) This enables the GoS 
to work closely with local authorities in preparing national development policies and 
plans. An interviewee (Melusi Masuku, Under Secretary of the  Political Department) 
explained the procedure used by the GoS to engage with its citizens in the policy 
formulation process (see appendix 2): 
(t)he formulation of policies is done through vigorous consultations with regional administrators. It is 
through the tinkhundla centres where issues of national concern are addressed, and the process of 
addressing these issues begins with addressing local authorities/local administration. The issues are then 
brought forward to the regional administrators, who delegate regional secretaries who are then tasked 
with the responsibility of setting up consultations with the local chiefs of that particular inkhundla. The 
chiefs will then allow the stakeholders to address their constituents this process applies to all 55 
tinkhundla/constituencies.
26
 
The approach taken by the GoS in developing its NDS, PRASP and polices has been 
through consultations with a broad spectrum of organisations, including the parliament, 
civil society, traditional leaders and the private sector. However, this approach is purely 
consultative. As such, involved parties – CSOs, parliamentarians, private sector actors – 
are not involved in the entire policy cycle from planning to implementation, nor to 
monitoring and evaluation. To this effect, the GoS has acknowledged that the 
monitoring and the subsequent reporting on the implementation of development 
strategies have not been very effective outside the Cabinet. According to the OECD 
(2011c, p. 3) this has brought “(...) concerns about the weak transition from planning 
into implementing Swaziland’s development strategies”, and that “(...) the country 
needs to put in place appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure it exercises 
effective leadership.”     
 
                                                          
26
Remember (see chapter 4) that an inkhundla is singular and tinkhundla is plural and represents all 55 
constituencies, and that each region consists of a number of constituencies.  
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5.2.1. Incorporating Poverty Reduction into Strategic Action 
“[p]artner countries commit to: translate these national development strategies into 
prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in medium-term 
expenditure frameworks and annual budgets.” (OECD, 2005a, p. 3) 
At the core of Swaziland’s development agenda is the serious need to address the issue 
of poverty reduction. However the country’s overall economic performance on the 
period 2004-2012 has placed serious strains on budget and policy direction. According 
to the National Development Plan 2009/10-2011/12 (GoS, 2009b, p. 72), 
(...) due to the deepening of the country’s poverty profile, as well as the rise in numerous needs competing 
for the limited public resources, the drive towards prudent fiscal management was relaxed. Moreover, the 
rising and unsustainable salary inflation could see the Government not reaching her policy target of a 
balanced budget. Presently wages account for over 53 percent of recurrent expenditure compared to the 
35 percent policy target.    
Table 5.1: Social and Economic Sector Budget Allocation 2004/05-2008/09 
(E Million) 
 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
27
 Annual 
Average 
share  
Total Revenue and 
Grants 
5,027.1 5,389.7             8,020.7 8,095.9 9,311.0  
Personnel  2,155.5 2,443.0 2,588.7 2,756.3 9,923.7 40.2% 
Education 1,316.5 1,280.1 1,471.8 1,594.4 1,821.1 22% 
Health 443.5 509.7 621.3 763.9 837.7 9.2% 
Social Protection 107.5 140.7 187.8 310.8 354.6 3.1% 
Housing and 
Amenities 
206.4 247.2 75.2 222.1 280.2 3% 
Water Resource 
Management  
216.9 228.9 119.3 453.5 423.9 4.1% 
Agriculture, forestry 
and Fishery 
265.8 216.4 494.4 348.8 510.9 5.3% 
Mining, 
Manufacturing and 
construction 
100.6 103.8 36.1 35.4 88.6 1.1% 
Commerce and Trade 23.8 25.2 158.6 129.0 272.8 1.6% 
Transport and 
Communications  
491.4 578.9 824.1 661.3 1058.1 10.4% 
Energy and Fuel 16.9 17.3 19.4 23.1 35.4 0.3% 
Source: GoS (2009b, p. 26) 
                                                          
27
 The year 2008/09 reflects the estimated budget outturn at the time. It has proven to be difficult to 
access a more updated version of expenditure figures. 
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Faced with an unfavourable fiscal climate, the GoS budget per sector –in particular the 
social sector –has been limited and the composition of spending does not place social 
agenda as a high priority area, as table 5.1 (above) illustrates. 
5.2.2. Designing a Budget in Support of Development Priorities  
Swaziland’s current fiscal position is in need of improvement. A temporary remedy has 
come in the form of an increased SACU envelope, which has boosted Swaziland’s 
public revenue for the 2012/13 fiscal year. However fiscal imbalances are still present 
as expenditure continues to run high (Basdevant et al., 2013, p. 15). Swaziland’s 
vulnerable fiscal position and high government expenditure is one of the major 
impediments towards the realisation of the NDS. Another major challenges faced with 
regard to the low operationality of Swaziland’s NDS is that policy-makers rarely use the 
NDS as a reference for linking sector strategies and formulating budget priorities 
(OECD, 2011c, p. 3). For example, in the 2007/2008 fiscal year Swaziland’s GDP stood 
at E8.095,9 millions, of that E 2.756,3 million (34 per cent of GDP) were used for 
personnel wages, E1.594,4 million were allocated to the education sector, E763,9 
millions to the health sector, E348,8 millions to agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and 
E129,0 millions to commerce and trade (GoS, 2009b, pp. 23-26). The increasingly high 
wage bill has placed limitations on the development of both the health and education 
sectors, and has created very little space for the government to promote a robust private 
sector. The lack of correspondence between the NDS and expenditure is a reason of 
concern. According to the OECD (2012, p. 3) this strategic disconnection can be 
described as follows: 
(t)he strategic link to the budget is weak, and considering the lack of costing in the strategy, there are 
vague linkages between the NDS and the medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF)/budget process, as well 
as between sector strategies and the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF). There is only minimal 
evidence of performance orientation in the budget. 
As a result of the fiscal climate there has been low access to key healthcare and 
education services – which resulted in a higher school dropout rate – leaving many poor 
Swazis in a worsened state (Basdevant et al., 2013, p. 15). Another case for concern is 
that in 2011/12 social spending was much lower than budgeted by about E 500 millions, 
and several investment projects with poverty-alleviating components (i.e., school 
extensions) were stopped, while other investment projects (i.e., the construction of the 
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new Sikhupe airport
28
) were given priority (Basdevant et al., 2013, p. 15). This 
inadequate strategic link to the budgetary process and development prioritiesalso has 
adverse effects on Swaziland’s ability to achieve the MDGs, in particular the goals by 
the target year of 2015. Although the MDG’s have been prioritised in the NDS and the 
PRASP on a variety of cross-cutting themes, they do not appear to be well integrated or 
mainstreamed, and the mechanisms for achieving these targets have not been well 
developed (OECD, 2011c, p. 3.).  
An interviewee classified Swaziland’s budgetary weakness under three categories: weak 
budget planning and formulation; weak budget execution; and inadequate budget 
oversight. Here are just some of the weaknesses highlighted under each category by the 
intervieweeDeepak Sardiwal, an economist at the MEPD (see appendix 2): 
i. Weak budget planning and formulation: budget planning and formulation 
remains inadequate because of the absence of a medium-term perspective in 
budget formulation; of inadequate availability and usage of statistical data for 
evidence-based planning and budgeting; and lack of a policy-orientated, 
output-focused and performance-based orientation to the budget associated 
with a lack of accountability and transparency with regard to public spending. 
ii. Weak budget execution: budget execution remains inadequate due to 
limitations in the current Integral Financial Management Information System 
such that not all commitments are captured in the system; unclear long-term 
debt management and financing strategies; and outdated regulations and 
instructions on public financial management.  
iii. Inadequate budget oversight: oversight of budget implementation remains 
inadequate and this weakens accountability arrangements and possibilities for 
corrective measures to be taken. The main reasons for weak budget oversight 
include: the inadequate capacity of bodies/institutions that exercise a public 
financial management oversight function. 
The GoS lacks of expenditure controls, which is in part due to the weakness of PFM 
systems, and partly due to the lack of political and social consensus on the reforms to be 
                                                          
28
Interestingly, in 2010 the GoS halved many capital commitments to offset the impact of lower SACU 
revenue. During that same year a supplementary budget was issued to regularise capital expenditure 
overruns of about E350 million for the Sikhupe airport project, which further deepened the fiscal crisis 
(Mongardini, et al., 2011, p. 5). 
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implemented (Basdevant et al., 2013, p. 13). The composition of spending also needs to 
be re-oriented towards social priorities and poverty issues. Social sector prioritisation, 
such as improving health outcomes, is not limited to improvements in welfare but also 
increases income-earning potential. While increasing education not only improves 
welfare, it may also lead to better health outcomes and higher incomes (World Bank, 
2001, p. 15). Social sector prioritisation can also help stimulate investment in human 
capital, which is one of the goals set out in the PRASP. This is of particular importance 
to Swaziland as the country continues to face considerable pressures in the development 
of human capital as it holds the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence in the world, and access 
to healthcare and education have been reduced during the current fiscal crisis 
(Basdevant et al., 2013, p. 23).  
The GoS has taken measures and reforms to deal with the challenges of the fiscal crisis 
through the FAR and the ERS. The FAR, in particular, aims at bringing the country’s 
fiscal position to sustainable levels through revenue enhancement and better expenditure 
control, particularly the large wage bill, and at creating space for the government’s 
commitment to increase spending in the healthcare and education sectors (AfDB, 2011, 
p. 13). The FAR and the ERS have contributed to the successful establishment and full 
operationalisaton of the Swaziland Revenue Authority (SRA) in 2011, the enactment of 
an improved Procurement Act in 2011, and the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) 
in 2012 (GoS, 2013, p. 15). The FAR played a particularly important role in the 
establishment of the SRA, which has achieved one of the PRASP goals of “redesigning 
a tax system conducive to investment and growth” through the introduction of VAT 
(GoS, 2005b, p. 26). The FAR has fallen short as it has failed to set targets on poverty 
alleviation spending, notably health and education. In addition, according to Basdevant 
et al. (2013, p. 24), “(t)he FAR does not provide an adequate framework to strengthen 
expenditure controls.”  
5.3. Towards Aid Effectiveness in Swaziland 
“[p]artner countries are committed to: take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in 
conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the 
participation of civil society and the private sector” (OECD, 2005a, p. 3) 
In 1997, the GoS developed an aid policy which provides the framework for 
management of external assistance, aiming to channel external assistance towards 
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activities with a maximum impact on national development (GoS, 1999b, p. 2). The 
responsibilities for aid coordination and management are ascribed to the line ministries: 
MEPD, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Service, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation. Aid policy also provides for an External 
Assistance Committee (EAC) which functions as a steering committee on technical 
issues that are multi-sectoral or cross-ministerial in nature. The EAC is made up of 
principal secretaries/or delegated senior officials from the line ministries (GoS, 1999b, 
pp. 3-10). The MEPD is tasked with the management and coordination of ODA. This is 
done through the Aid Coordination Management Section (ACMS) (GoS, 2011b, p. 12). 
In spite of its function as an aid management and coordinating body, the ACMS has 
experienced challenges in fulfilling its mandate, which include (GoS, 2011b, p. 13)  
(...) fragmented efforts in resource mobilisation, the line ministries initiate and conclude resource 
mobilisation without involving the ACMS, some donors give aid to Swaziland without liaising with the 
ACMS, poor coordination and the fact that there is no holistic picture of how much aid is received by the 
Kingdom and no system to properly monitor commitments and disbursements of ODA.   
During the Aid Effectiveness Retreat with development partners on the 27
th.
 to the 28
th.
 
October 2011, development partners/donors raised the following concerns about 
Swaziland’s aid policy:  
i. Aid policy tends to be grant and project orientated and does not present 
guidelines on preferred aid modalities, or on donor’s coordination mechanisms. 
The policy also lacks ownership beyond the MEPD; 
ii. Aid policy needs to be reviewed to be consistent with the Paris Declaration 
principles and objectives, and it also needs to outline mechanisms towards more 
effective development assistance management (GoS, 2011b, p. 14).  
5.3.1. Official Development Assistance to Swaziland  
ODA plays a very important role in supporting national efforts to reduce poverty in 
developing countries, as it supplements local sources of financing and stimulates 
domestic investment. Like many developing countries, Swaziland relies on ODA to 
assist the country on poverty reduction objectives, and during the financial year 
2011/2012 Swaziland was the recipient of an estimated US$ 132,9 million in ODA 
(GoS, 2013, p. 22). In regional terms, the donor’s presence in Swaziland has been 
somewhat weaker than in other countries (Kabemba et al., 2004, p. 33). As illustrated 
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
69 
 
by fig 5.1, ODA to Swaziland has been reflectively low. However, from the year 2010 
onwards the country witnessed a dramatic increase in ODA.  
Fig. 5.1: Swaziland: Net Official Development Assistance Received 
 
Source: World Bank (2013c) 
It should be noted that measuring ODA in Swaziland is also somewhat problematic due 
to the lack of readily available data. Swaziland’s ability to capture ODA and aid flows is 
limited to aid directed to the GoS and also that which is directed to Parastatals and 
NGOs through the government (GoS, 2010b, p. 72). Adding to this problem is the 
government’s inability to effectively record donors’ commitments and disbursements. 
This is, in part, due to the lack of an effective management information system. 
Furthermore, ODA is rarely captured in the national budget (GoS, 2011b, p. 4). The 
absence of a system to record ODA to Swaziland makes it difficult to verify the amount 
of aid disbursed, and whether the amounts that are being recorded are disbursements or 
commitments. Nonetheless, the GoS has made efforts to coordinate and manage aid by 
the MEPD through the ACMS (GoS, 2013, p. 16). The ACMS, in collaboration with 
multilateral and bilateral development partners, which include the African 
Development, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), the 
European Union, the Global Fund, Japan, Republic of China (Taiwan), United Nations, 
United States and the World Bank, provided the total volume of ODA disbursed to 
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Swaziland in the financial year 2011/2012
29
 , as illustrated in table 5.1
30
 (GoS, 2013, 
p.22).   
Table 5.2: Official Development Aid to Swaziland 2011/2012 
Development Partner  ODA (US$) ODA provided as grants (%) 
African Development Bank 9,074,858 26.3 
BADEA 2,530,048 0 
European Union 19,122,559 100 
Global Fund  16,079,855 100 
Japan (JICA) 17,784,702 100 
Republic of China (Taiwan) 22,267,169 100 
United Nations (FAO, IFAD, 
UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP) 
16,756,388 90.7 
United States (PEPFAR) 29,201,667 100 
World Bank 131,047 48.7 
Total  132,948,293 91.8 
Source: GoS (2013, pp. 22-24). 
5.3.2. Development Partners in Swaziland  
The Paris Declaration states that donors need to commit to “[b]ase their overall support 
on partners’ national development strategies”, and that donors should “[l]ink funding to 
a single framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from the 
national development strategy.”  (OECD, 2005a, p. 3) The EU is one of Swaziland’s 
largest development partners. The Cotonou Agreement provides the legal basis for EU 
cooperation with ACP countries, with the priority of promoting the development of a 
common strategic approach to poverty reduction by taking into account the fundamental 
principles set out in Article 2 of the Cotonou Agreement, in particular the 
encouragement of ownership of the development strategy (GoS and European 
Commission, 2007, pp. 1-2). Cooperation between the EU and the Swaziland is 
                                                          
29
 The Swazi fiscal year runs from the 1
st
. April to the 31
st
. March.  
30
 The information presented on the abovementioned tables does not capture the total amount of ODA to 
Swaziland, and therefore does not serve as an accurate representation of aid flows between Swaziland and 
all its donors. Other development partners, such as Kuwait, and the European Investment Bank, also 
provide external assistance to Swaziland, however the support is not channelled through or coordinated 
and monitored by the CMS (GoS, 2013, p. 21). 
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approached through a Joint Country Strategy Paper and a National Indicative 
Programme. It is through this framework that resources are allocated in support of 
poverty reduction strategies and policies. The EU provides grant assistance to 
Swaziland through the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development 
Cooperation Instrument, and loan financing through the European Investment Bank and 
technical assistance (GoS, 2011b, p. 9).  
The UN agencies (which include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the World Food 
Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)) undertake development interventions in 
Swaziland through the guidance of the United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework (UNDAF). The UNDAF is aligned with Swaziland’s national development 
priorities and allows for resource planning which drives the programmes under which 
the UN system supports Swaziland (UNDG, 2011, p. 3).  
The World Bank provides some grant assistance for programme development, but 
predominantly provides loan financing through the IBRD, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the International Development Association and technical assistance 
(GoS, 2011b, p. 9). The African Development Bank (AfDB) provides some grant 
assistance for programme development, but predominantly provides loan financing and 
technical assistance (GoS, 2011b, p. 9). The AfDB assists in addressing the 
development challenges through the Country Strategy Paper, which is based on the GoS 
development agenda as specified in the NDS and the PRASP (AfDB, 2011, p. 11).    
The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)/the Global Fund, 
has approved grants with an amount of US$ 199.857.439 to Swaziland, and has to the 
date disbursed US$ 157.078.620 (Global Fund, 2013). Swaziland’s principal recipient 
for the GFTAM grants in the National Emergency Response Council on HIV/AIDS 
(NERCHA). NERCHA is responsible for allocating GFTAM grants to secondary 
recipients and implementing partners. It is also tasked with implementing Swaziland’s 
National Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS (Daku, 2012, p. 3).    
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
72 
 
The Government of the United States of America (US) provides grant assistance for 
projects through USAID, and through the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR), as well as technical assistance (GoS, 2011b, p. 9). The majority of 
US funding to Swaziland comes from PEPFAR and it is guided by a joint strategic 
agenda for cooperation, the Partnership Framework for HIV and AIDS between the GoS 
and US (GoS and USG, 2009, p. 2). The Republic of China/Taiwan provides grant 
assistance and technical assistance to Swaziland through Taiwan’s International 
Cooperation and Development Fund, which is usually for individual projects in a 
variety of sectors (GoS, 2011b, p. 9). Finally, Japan provides grants and technical 
assistance to Swaziland through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (GoS, 
2011b, p. 10). 
5.3.3. Donor’s Support for Development Priorities 
During the Aid Effectiveness Retreat, donors made a few observations with regard to 
key national planning frameworks (NDS, PRASP, ERS, FAR). One of them was, 
according to the GoS (2011b, p. 17) “[t]he confusion that exists amongst Development 
Partners as to which policies are currently being prioritised by the Government.” During 
the retreat the GoS initiated SWAps, and in this context stated that “SWAp planning 
and budgeting be adopted, and phased in overtime, starting with selected sectors, 
namely Education, Health and Agriculture and Fisheries” (GoS, 2013, p. 25). This has 
been reflected in development partners’ sector allocation of development aid in 
2011/2012, as illustrated by Fig 5.2(below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessing the Paris Declaration: Swaziland’s Ownership over its Poverty Reduction 
Strategies and Priorities 
2013 
 
73 
 
Fig 5.2: Sector Allocation of Official Development Aid in Swaziland 2011/12 
 
Source: GoS (2013, p. 26). 
In March 2011 the GoS and development partners in Swaziland participated for the first 
time in the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey (OECD, 2011c, p. 1). The Survey shed 
some light on both the achievements and the shortcomings of the GoS-donor 
partnership against the 2010 aid effectiveness targets. The results of Survey are 
illustrated on table 5.3(below).    
Table 5.3:Summary of Swaziland’s Results, Challenges and Priority Actions from the 
Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey, 2011 
 
Paris Declaration 
Indicator 
Results for Swaziland Results for Swaziland  
Ownership 
(1) Operational 
development strategies 
No operational development 
strategy in place  
Challenge: The operationalilty 
of Swaziland’s NDS is low 
Action: improve the link 
between NDS and long-term 
vision, and between strategic 
priorities and resource 
allocation.  
Alignment 
(3) Aid flows are 
aligned on national 
priorities  
56% reported on budget Challenge: Limited use of 
country systems by donors and 
limited recording of aid on 
budget. (4) Strengthen capacity 76% of technical cooperation 
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by co-ordinated support flows were disbursed through 
coordinated programmes   
Action: Government should take 
a greater lead in encouraging the 
use of country systems among 
donors and improving their 
reliability; improve the link 
between policy formulation and 
budgeting.  
(5a) Use of country 
public financial 
management systems  
5% of ODA disbursed by 
donors in 2010 used 
Swaziland’s procurements 
systems  
(5b) Use country 
procurement systems  
12% of ODA disbursed by 
donors in 2010 used 
Swaziland’s procurement 
systems 
(6) Strengthen capacity 
by avoiding parallel 
implementation units  
Swaziland has only 3 PIUs 
(7) Aid is more 
predictable  
86% of scheduled aid was 
actually disbursed 
(8) Aid is untied  92% of aid was untied in 
2009 
 
Harmonisation 
(9) Use of common 
arrangements or 
procedures 
35% of aid flows are 
provided in the context of 
PBAs 
Challenge: Limited use of 
programme-based approaches. 
Action: Greater efforts are 
needed to develop programme-
based approaches and promote 
their use.  
(10a) Encourage shared 
analysis  
27% of donor missions were 
coordinated 
(10b) Country analytic 
work 
26% of country analytic work 
was coordinated  
Managing for Results 
(11) Results-orientated 
frameworks 
No transparent and 
monitorable performance 
assessment frameworks in 
place  
Challenge: Lack of a 
coordination structure and 
institutional responsibility to 
monitor and evaluate national 
development strategies. 
Action: Establish a centralised 
monitoring and evaluation unit 
to ensure coordinated and 
comprehensive reporting on 
progress; track input, output, 
and outcome indicators 
identified in the NDS and 
promote their utilisation among 
policy makers.  
Mutual Accountability 
(12) Mutual 
Accountability  
Criteria not yet met  Challenge: Lack of assessment 
of country-level and 
effectiveness targets by both 
government and donors. 
Action: Institutionalise mutual 
accountability frameworks for 
regular and periodic assessments 
of country-level aid 
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effectiveness targets.  
Source: Adapted from GoS (2013, pp. 18-19), OECD (2005a, p. 11) and OECD (2011c, 
p. 2). 
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VI. Conclusion 
Through a predominantly qualitative approach, this dissertation has provided some 
insights into the efforts made by the GoS towards taking greater leadership over its 
poverty reduction priorities and strategies. The dissertation has also taken a glimpse into 
the role played by the development partners in Swaziland, and their efforts in assisting 
the GoS realise its poverty reduction goals. By assessing the efforts made by the GoS 
towards achieving poverty reduction through prioritised strategies and plans derived 
from the NDS and implemented through the PRASP, the main findings of the 
dissertation have been assessed and categorised under the following partner country 
commitments to achieve greater ownership over development policies and strategies as 
stated in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda:  
1. Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development 
strategies through broad consultative processes; 
2. Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented 
operational programmes, as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks 
and annual budgets; 
3. Take lead in coordinating aid at all levels together with other development 
resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil 
society and the private sector.  
In accordance with the principle of ownership, the GoS has exercised leadership over its 
development priorities and strategies through the development of the NDS and the 
PRASP. The Paris Declaration also states that it is imperative for partner countries to 
not only take leadership in developing national development strategies, but also in 
implementing these strategies through broad consultative processes. The NDS had a 
clear long-term vision for the development of Swaziland, and the PRASP is the vessel 
through which this vision will be implemented. The PRASP sets out clear objectives 
and strategies that aim to address the multi-dimensional levels of poverty in Swaziland, 
bearing in mind that these objectives are also consistent with the MDGs. The NDS is 
the long-term development vision for Swaziland, while the PRASP frames Swaziland’s 
development agenda through interlinked key pillars. The pillars that best correspond 
with the development of the dissertation are: macroeconomic stability, income 
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redistribution through fiscal policy, investment in human capital, improving governance 
and strengthening institutions. Both the NDS and the PRASP have been formulated 
through intensive consultative processes with a variety of stakeholders which include 
the poor, government officers, NGOs, chiefs, Members of Parliament, the donor 
community, and the private sector. However, this inclusive process is limited by the 
weak transition from planning into implementing Swaziland’s development strategies, 
and does not cover a whole policy cycle. Monitoring and reporting on the 
implementation of development strategies is not very effective outside of cabinet.   
Obtaining macroeconomic stability is an essential element to poverty reduction, and yet 
it has been somewhat of a struggle in recent years as Swaziland continues to experience 
major economic instability. Following the global economic crisis, Swaziland 
experienced an unprecedented fiscal deficit during the years 2009-2011. Swaziland’s 
financial crisis was at its worst during the years 2010/11, with a fiscal deficit of an 
estimated 13,9 percent of GDP. This has had an adverse effect on poverty reduction 
efforts as resources for key poverty-alleviating projects and investments were drastically 
decreased, which resulted in many projects being stopped. 
One of the cross-cutting issues throughout the PRASP is the need for a redesigned tax 
system. Accordingly, the GoS has made some important moves in more recent years 
towards an improved tax system and to curb the effects the financial crisis has had on 
the country by introducing the FAR in 2010 and the ERS in 2011. These documents 
have been instrumental in establishing the fully operational SRA in 2011, which 
consequently paved way to the introduction of VAT in 2012, thus achieving the goal of 
a redesigned tax system. The introduction of VAT is a positive step towards facilitating 
the objective of income redistribution set out in the PRASP. Although economic growth 
has averaged at 2,4 percent of GDP from the years 2003-2011 income redistribution 
remains a major component of poverty reduction, in particular income redistribution 
through fiscal policy, as stated in the PRASP. Income redistribution through fiscal 
policy is an important tool for reducing inequalities, and equally importantly for 
investing in human capital. Swaziland’s classification as a lower-middle income country 
masks the realities of a highly skewed income distribution. In 2010 the income share 
held by the highest 10 percent of the population was at an estimated 41 percent, while 
the income share held by the lowest 10 percent of the population was estimated at 1,7 
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percent. This severely counteracts economic expansion and further perpetuates poverty. 
Income redistribution through strong and fair policies is vital in order to achieve poverty 
reduction. This is a particularly difficult task for the GoS given the overall economic 
performance during the period 2003-2012 which has placed serious strains on the GoS 
budget and policy direction.  
One of the major areas of concern over the years has been the GoS inability to 
effectively link its budget to policy direction, in particular the weak correspondence 
between budget and poverty reduction priorities such as those geared towards the 
development of human capital. On the 2004-2009 period, the annual average share of 
GDP for government expenditure on personnel accounted for an estimated 40,2 percent, 
the education sector accounted for an estimated 22 percent, and the health sector 
accounted for an estimated 9,2 percent. This is instructive of a weak strategic link 
between budget, policy and the NDS, as well as between sector strategies and the 
medium-term expenditure framework. It is imperative that the GoS takes stronger 
leadership over social sector prioritisation in order to stimulate investment in human 
capital. The health sector, in particular, is in need of greater budgetary prioritisation. 
This is important as Swaziland has the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence in the world, and 
the reduced access to health care and education places considerable pressure on the 
development of human capital.   
In regional terms donors’ presence in Swaziland is very low, as there is a combined 
total of nine bilateral and multilateral donors. Regardless, ODA to Swaziland has played 
a vital role in supporting the GoS towards poverty reduction objectives. Donors have 
also made efforts to align their support with the Swaziland’s NDS and PRASP through 
country strategies and policy dialogues. During the financial year 2011/2012 Swaziland 
received an estimated US$ 132,9 millions in ODA. A large portion of the ODA received 
was allocated to the health sector, followed by the education and training sectors, and 
then the agricultural sector. Aid coordination and management in Swaziland are guided 
by the National Aid Policy, which a came into being in 1999. The ACMS of the MEPD 
has been tasked with the responsibility of managing and coordinating ODA. It has been 
noted that both the Aid Policy and the ACMS suffer from a few setbacks. The Aid 
Policy has been criticised of being outdated, and that it needs to be consistent with the 
Paris Declaration principles and objectives. 
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It has also been criticised for lacking ownership beyond the MEPD. The ACMS has also 
suffered some setbacks of its own in fulfilling its mandate. In many instances the line 
ministries and donors alike have failed to liaise with the ACMS when initiating and 
concluding resources mobilisation. There is also an apparent lack in a system that 
effectively monitors commitments and disbursements of ODA to Swaziland. This 
makes it extremely difficult to ascertain a holistic picture of how much aid has been 
received. The GoS needs to strengthen its leadership over aid coordination through the 
ACMS, aid coordination needs to be improved in all sectors, especially the line 
ministries. Donors need to have greater support for the GoS aid co-ordination efforts by 
working more closely with the ACMS.  
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Appendixes  
Appendix 1   
Official list of MDG Indicators  
All indicators should be disaggregated by sex and urban/rural as far as possible. 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Goals and Targets 
(from the Millennium Declaration) 
Indicators for monitoring progress 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than one dollar a day 
1.1 Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day 
1.2 Poverty gap ratio  
1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption 
Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and 
decent work for all, including women and young people 
 
1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed 
1.5 Employment-to-population ratio 
1.6 Proportion of employed people living below $1 (PPP) per 
day 
1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family 
workers in total employment  
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger 
1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age 
1.9 Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary 
energy consumption 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys 
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of 
primary schooling 
2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education 
2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade 
of  primary  
2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of 
education no later than 2015 
3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary 
education 
3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-
agricultural sector 
3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality  
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, 
the under-five mortality rate 
  
4.1 Under-five mortality rate 
4.2 Infant mortality rate 
4.3 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against 
measles 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health  
Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, 
the maternal mortality ratio 
5.1 Maternal mortality ratio 
5.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel  
Target 5.B: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to 
reproductive health 
 
5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate  
5.4 Adolescent birth rate 
5.5 Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four 
visits) 
5.6 Unmet need for family planning  
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
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Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS 
  
  
  
  
6.1 HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24 years  
6.2 Condom use at last high-risk sex 
6.3 Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with 
comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS 
6.4 Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance 
of non-orphans aged 10-14 years 
Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment 
for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it 
6.5 Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection 
with access to antiretroviral drugs 
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
incidence of malaria and other major diseases 
  
  
  
  
6.6 Incidence and death rates associated with malaria 
6.7 Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-
treated bednets 
6.8 Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are treated 
with appropriate anti-malarial drugs 
6.9 Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with 
tuberculosis 
6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under 
directly observed treatment short course  
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and programmes and 
reverse the loss of environmental resources 
  
   
Target 7.B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving,  by 2010, a 
significant reduction in the rate of loss 
7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forest 
7.2 CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per $1 GDP (PPP) 
7.3 Consumption of ozone-depleting substances 
7.4 Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological limits 
7.5 Proportion of total water resources used   
7.6 Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected 
7.7 Proportion of species threatened with extinction 
Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
7.8 Proportion of population using an improved drinking water 
source 
7.9 Proportion of population using an improved sanitation 
facility 
Target 7.D: By 2020, to have achieved a significant 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers 
7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums    
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development 
Target 8.A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, 
non-discriminatory trading and financial system 
 
Includes a commitment to good governance, development and 
poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally 
 
Target 8.B: Address the special needs of the least developed 
Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately 
for the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked 
developing countries and small island developing States. 
Official development assistance (ODA) 
8.1 Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as 
percentage of OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income 
8.2 Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of 
OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic 
education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and 
sanitation) 
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countries 
 
Includes: tariff and quota free access for the least developed 
countries' exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for 
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of 
official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries 
committed to poverty reduction 
 
 
Target 8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked 
developing countries and small island developing States 
(through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States and the 
outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General 
Assembly) 
 
 
 
Target 8.D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of 
developing countries through national and international 
measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term 
8.3 Proportion of bilateral official development assistance of 
OECD/DAC donors that is untied 
8.4 ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a 
proportion of their gross national incomes 
8.5 ODA received in small island developing States as a 
proportion of their gross national incomes 
Market access 
8.6 Proportion of total developed country imports (by value 
and excluding arms) from developing countries and least 
developed countries, admitted free of duty 
8.7 Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on 
agricultural products and textiles and clothing from 
developing countries 
8.8 Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a 
percentage of their gross domestic product 
8.9 Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity 
Debt sustainability 
8.10 Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC 
decision points and number that have reached their HIPC 
completion points (cumulative) 
8.11 Debt relief committed under HIPC and MDRI Initiatives 
8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and 
services 
Target 8.E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, 
provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing 
countries 
8.13 Proportion of population with access to affordable 
essential drugs on a sustainable basis 
Target 8.F: In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available the benefits of new technologies, especially 
information and communications 
8.14 Fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants  
8.15 Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 
8.16 Internet users per 100 inhabitants 
 
Source: Adapted from (UN, 2008) [Online] Available at 
<http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm> 
(accessed, 10.01.13). 
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Appendix 2 
Interview Details 
Name of Institution Interviewee details:  Date of 
interview 
Ministry of Economic Planning 
and Development (MEPD) 
Name: Deepak Sardiwal 
Economist 
deepak@mepd-acms.org  
05/05/2013 
National Emergency Response 
Council on HIV/AIDS 
(NERCHA) 
Name: Lucas Jele 
SHAPMoS Manager  
lucas@nercha.org.sz 
05/07/2013 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Co-operation 
Name: Melusi Masuku 
Under Secretary-Political  
(+268) 24042661/4 
04/07/2013 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 
Name: Shadrack Tsabedze 
 shadracktsabedze@undp.org 
14/07/2013 
United Nations Children Fund 
(UNICEF) 
Name: Muriel Mafico 
Deputy Representative  
mmafico@unicef.org 
23/07/2013 
European Commission   Name: Alice Peslin 
alice.peslin@eeas.europa.eu 
n.a 
Presidents Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
Name: Sabelo Kunene 
kuneness@state.gov 
n.a 
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Appendix 3 
Donor Questionnaire 
Interview guide/ Questionnaire 
Research on Government Ownership in Swaziland    
 
 
Introduction 
 
The momentum created by the Paris Declaration has produced an international 
consensus on how to best achieve development goals, and accelerate the achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Paris declaration has a reform agenda 
– through the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, 
and mutual accountability- to make aid more effective by improving aid delivery and 
management. At the centre of the reform agenda to make aid more effective is the 
partner countries ownership of their national development policies and programmes, as 
reflected in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. The purpose of this 
interview/ questionnaire is to gain some insight on efforts made by the Government of 
Swaziland (GoS) in taking stronger leadership over its development policies, and the 
donor community’s efforts in support of country ownership.   
 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
Donor Agency: 
Email address:  
Date of interview: 
 
General Questions  
1. How long has this agency been situated in Swaziland?  
 2. What kind of aid do you provide (grants, loans, etc)? 
 3. What are, in this agency’s view, the development priorities of this country? 
4. Which development priorities does your agency support? And in what ways does 
your agency support these priorities? 
Ownership 
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1. Are the national development policies of Swaziland consistent with international 
commitments of Gender equality, human rights, disability, and environmental 
sustainability? Yes/No, please elaborate. 
2. Does Swaziland’s National Development Plan adequately reflects the country’s 
development priorities?   
3. Does the National Development Plan allocate appropriate resources towards poverty 
reduction? Yes/No please elaborate.  
4. To your knowledge, in what ways has the GoS worked closely with representative 
bodies (i.e. Parliament, CSOs, media, research institutes, and private sector) in the 
development and implementation of national development policies and strategies? 
5. What efforts are being made towards the participation of a broader range of 
stakeholders in policy dialogue in Swaziland? 
6. How would you describe the GoS capacity (i.e. institutions, systems, and local 
expertise) to lead and manage its development processes? 
7. Does your organisation play a supporting role in capacity development (i.e. technical 
co-operation) of the GoS?  Yes/No, please elaborate.  
Alignment  
1. To what extent is aid provided by your agency aligned with Swaziland’s development 
priorities? 
2. Does the GoS’s National Development Strategy (NDS) and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy and Action Plan (PRSAP) set out clear targets that allow donors to align their 
programming with? 
3. Does your agency have a strategy that enables you to align your assistance behind the 
needs and priorities of the NDS and the PRSAP? If yes, please describe this strategy. If 
no, please elaborate on how else your agency aligns itself according to the needs and 
priorities of the NDS and PRSAP. 
4. Does your agency perform periodic reviews in implementing these strategies? If 
yes/no, please elaborate.  
5. Does the GoS have effective public financial management (PFM) systems?   
6. In w hat ways does your agency use the GoS PFM systems? If not, what aid delivery 
mechanism does your agency use, and what is the rationale of this? 
Sector Wide Approaches  
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1. Does your agency support sector wide approaches? 
2. How many sector programmes are you involved in and what do they consist of? 
3.  What government-led processes of donor coordination have been put in place at 
sector levels?  
Closing Remarks 
Is there anything you would like to add to this interview/questionnaire? 
 
 
 GoS Questionnaire 
Interview guide/ Questionnaire 
Research on Government Ownership in Swaziland    
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The momentum created by the Paris Declaration has produced an international 
consensus on how to best achieve development goals, and accelerate the achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Paris declaration has a reform agenda 
– through the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, 
and mutual accountability- to make aid more effective by improving aid delivery and 
management. At the centre of the reform agenda to make aid more effective is the 
partner countries ownership of their national development policies and programmes, as 
reflected in the Paris Declaration and the Accra agenda for action. The purpose of this 
interview/ questionnaire is to gain some insight on efforts made by the Government of 
Swaziland (GoS) in taking stronger leadership over its development policies, and the 
donor community’s efforts in support of country ownership.   
 
Handling of Information 
 
Kindly note: 
i. The information collected from this interview/questionnaire will assist in 
gaining some much needed insight on the topic presented.    
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ii. The information collected from the interview/ questionnaire will be used solely 
for the purpose of this Masters Dissertation. 
iii. The information will be handled with the utmost respect and confidence.  
iv. The interview will be recorded and will take place in a time frame of 1hr- 1hr 
30minutes. 
Name of Interviewee: 
Government Department: 
Email address:  
Date of interview: 
General Questions  
1. What are the Development priorities of Swaziland?  
 2. Briefly describe the development strategy of Swaziland? 
3. How accessible are Swaziland’s Short-term, medium-term, and long-term 
development strategies and policies to the general public?  
4. What is the primary form of funding the GoS receives? Grants, loans, ect. 
Ownership 
1.To what extent are the national development policies and strategies of Swaziland 
consistent with international commitments of gender equality, human rights, disability, 
and environmental sustainability? 
2. What efforts has the GoS made to working closely with representative bodies (i.e. 
Parliament, CSOs, media, research institutes, and private sector) in the development and 
implementation of national development policies and plans? 
3. What efforts are being made towards the participation of a broader range of 
stakeholders in policy dialogue in Swaziland? 
4. Does the participatory process cover the whole policy cycle? (from formulation 
through approval, implementation, monitoring and evaluation).  
5. What is the participatory approach used by the GoS? (Information sharing, 
consultation with stakeholders?) 
6. What efforts has the GoS made to facilitate alignment, harmonisation, and co-
ordination? (i.e. calling for regular meetings to discuss these principles)?  
 
Alignment  
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1. What efforts have been made by the GoS and the donor community to creating 
mutually agreed upon performance assessment frameworks? 
2. What efforts has the GoS made to strengthen institutions and systems to improve aid 
effectiveness? i.e national arrangements and procedures for public financial 
management, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring. 
3.To what extent do donors use country systems? 
4. “The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and 
programmes, is critical for achieving development objectives” The Paris Declaration.  
What capacity strengthening objectives has the GoS pursued in its national development 
strategies? (i.e sound technical analysis, broader social, political and economic 
environment, including the need to strengthen  human resources). 
5. May you identify areas in which the GoS needs to strengthen the capacity to perform 
and deliver services at a national, local government, sectoral level? 
6. Does the GoS have effective public financial management (PFM) systems?   
7. Do donor agencies use the GoS PFM systems? 
Sector Wide Approaches  
1. How many ministries have operational sector wide programmes? 
2.  Is there a government-led process of donor coordination in place at sector level?  
3. What framework for aid management has the GoS put in place? 
4. Which ministries are doing well in managing their frameworks for aid management? 
5. What framework has been put in place for the sharing of information between donor 
agencies and the GoS? 
6. Do donor agencies provide the GOS with information on planned aid flows?  
Closing Remarks 
Is there anything you would like to add to this interview/questionnaire? 
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Appendix 4 
Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth 
 Characteristics  
1. Traditional Society Production and Productivity are limited.  
Scientific knowledge is “pre-Newtonian.” Society 
is heavily agricultural.  
The social and political structure is hierarchical.  
The value system is geared to fatalism.  
 
2. Preconditions for take-off Productivity is still limited. 
The nation state is a necessary political 
development. 
Economic progress comes to be seen as necessary 
for public good. 
These preconditions generally come from some 
“external intrusion”.  
 
 
3. The take-off Rise in savings and in investment in economic 
expansion. 
Agriculture becomes mechanized and 
commercialized. 
New production methods are developed. An 
expanding class of capitalists arises. 
“Compound interest gets built into” [the nation’s] 
habits and institutional structures (cit. in Rostow, 
1960, p. 36). 
 
 
4. The drive to maturity Output increases faster than population. 
The nation engages in specialization and 
international trade. 
A nation can produce what it chooses. 
“Dependence is a matter of economic choice rather 
than a technological or institutional necessity” (cit. 
in Rostow, 1960, p. 10). 
 
 
5. High-mass consumption Production shifts to consumer goods and services. 
Real income can purchase much more than food 
and shelter. 
Quality of life becomes important, no longer 
dominated by the wish to expand technology. 
 
 
6. Beyond mass consumption Increased value is given to non-monetary aspects 
of life. 
Source: Adapted from Sheppard et al. (2009, p. 71). 
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Appendix 5 
Paris Declaration Indictors and Targets 2010 
 
Source: (OECD, 2011a, p. 19). 
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Appendix 6 
 
Swaziland Map with Regions and Cities  
 
 
Sources: [Online] Available at <http://www.vidiani.com/?p=10073>. [Accessed 
30/05/2013]. 
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Appendix 7 
Swaziland’s Exports and Imports by Region, and Top Ten Sources and 
Destinations    
Swaziland’s Exports and Imports by Region, 2004 
Region  Exports as a 
share of total 
(%) 
Imports as a 
share of total 
(%). 
World  100.00 100.00 
SADC 75.41 91.46 
North American Free Trade Agreement  
(NAFTA) 
10.18 0.38 
Oceania 5.33 0.03 
Rest of Africa  4.85 0.05 
Eastern Asia 2.16 1.52 
European Union 1.75 1.35 
Rest of Asia 0.23 5.16 
Rest of Europe  0.06 0.00 
Rest of Americas 0.02 0.01 
Other Regions 0.00 0.03 
MERCOSUR 0.00 0.03 
 
Swaziland’s top ten Sources of Imports and Destinations for Exports, 2004 
Country Exports as 
a share of 
total (%) 
 Imports as 
a share of 
total (%) 
1. South Africa  66.81 South Africa  90.76 
2. United States 10.12 Taiwan  3.04 
3. Mozambique  4.63 Hong Kong 1.16 
4. New Zealand  3.03 China 1.06 
5. Kenya 3.03 Mozambique 0.65 
6. Australia 2.30 Japan 0.46 
7. China 1.85 United States  0.33 
8.United Kingdom 0.98 Italy 0.28 
9. Tanzania 0.96 Germany 0.26 
10. Angola  0.93 Singapore  0.25 
    
    
 
Source: Adapted from SADC (2004, pp. 165-167). [Online] Available 
at<http://www.sadctrade.org/files/Intra-SADC-trade-performance-review-2006-7-
swaziland.pdf>. [Accessed 22/06/2013].  
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Appendix 8 
The Average Annual Exchange Rate of US$1-SZL and € 1-SZL 
Year US$ 1 SZL € 1 SZL 
2009 1 8.4163 1 11.6703 
2010 1 7.2123 1 9.5673 
2011 1 7.1724 1 9.9697 
2012 1 8.1092 1 10.4218 
Source: OANDA (2013) 
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Appendix 9 
Swaziland: Selected Economic Indicators and Fiscal Operations of the Central 
Government 2009-17 
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Source: Mongardini et al. (2011, pp. 17-18). 
 
 
